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 ABSTRACT 
 
I argue for a naturalized conception of the faculty of intuition with particular 
interest in intuition's role in moral contexts.  I examine intuition in philosophical 
discourse: namely, the Classic Intuitionists G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A. 
Prichard.  I bring to light relevant distinctions among their conceptions of intuition.  
The explanation of an intuitive faculty in their philosophy has come to stand for the 
paradigm of intuition in moral philosophy.  In the section following, I will present the 
objections that call into question intuition.  I draw from Robert Audi and Laurence 
BonJour since their respective projects attempt to deal with these same objections in 
an attempt to formulate respective Moderate Intuitionist positions.  I show how these 
objections raised against intuitionism are objections to the epistemological role of 
intuition.  After, examining the objections, I present Mediocre Intuitionism and 
Moderate Intuitionism both of which attempt to rearticulate the use of intuition in 
moral thinking in ways that are less objectionable.  I argue that all these conceptions 
of intuition are moot, inadequate or incomplete.  Finally, I examine research in 
cognitive science related to intuition and its bearing on the development a complete 
and adequate conception of intuition.  Empirical study of cognition illuminates how 
conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves as an intuition.  
Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture of intuition can be derived from various 
empirical studies.  Cognitive science will be able to tell us something about the 
immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the self-
evidence of intuition.  In particular, the results from empirical studies of intuition 
affect Moderate Intuitionists' reformulation of intuition.  These analyses point to a 
naturalized conception of intuition. 
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 Introduction 
 
The following is an analysis of a fundamental cognition in moral 
epistemology: intuition.  I venture to say that all interesting arguments in philosophy 
turn significantly on intuitions.  Consider arguments over Justice, Euthanasia, and 
Abortion: Various positions in these debates are marked out by differing intuitions.  
Yet, to a large extent, intuition is still unexamined.  I take as part of my thesis that 
intuition is a cognitive aspect of humans that can be studied by empirical science.  I 
set out to unearth what intuition is by elucidating how it is used in philosophical 
discourse and by its study in cognitive science.  Then, I draw these to concepts 
together to create a more coherent view of what it is that moral philosophy turns on: 
intuition. 
I articulate Classic and Moderate Intuitionists' conceptions of intuition, 
articulate arguments against these positions, and evaluate their legitimacy.  
Ultimately, I argue for a conception of intuition that draw from philosophical 
literature and conclusions drawn by cognitive science.1  Perhaps, the resulting 
naturalized conception of intuition is a necessary product of the methodology I have 
taken.  I am willing to bite the bullet on this point.  The very aim of this project is to 
advance a naturalized conception of intuition that is philosophically rigorous and 
consistent with cognitive science's study of the faculties of the human mind.  
                                                 
1 For those crying ‘foul’ since they already familiar with the fact that most intuitionist are non-
naturalist, let me preface the rest of this project with the following claim.  Intuitionism’s non-
naturalism has to do with the fact that moral facts are either non-natural properties or that intuited 
propositions contain (implicitly or explicitly) non-natural terms, e.g. ‘goodness’.  I take no position on 
whether moral facts are non-natural.  My aim here is not to naturalize the non-natural moral facts or to 
reduce non-natural moral terms to natural terms.  Instead, I aim to offer a naturalized account of the 
apprehension of them by what we sometimes call ‘intuition’.   
1 
 Empirical study of cognition illuminates how conscious and unconscious processes 
manifest themselves as an intuitive belief.  Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture 
of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies.  Cognitive science will be 
able to tell us some things about intuitive knowledge - about the immediacy of 
intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the self-evidence of 
intuition.   
Intuition in Philosophy 
 Rationalists use intuition as explanation for the means of arriving at the 
justification of a priori propositions.  Empiricists claim not to use intuition; however, 
in practice their moral arguments rely to some degree on intuitions.  Robert Audi 
writes, "[Intuition] is certainly conceived divergently among ethical theorists, and 
those who find its central elements compelling may often think it easiest and better 
simply to argue for their position under another name than to indicate what kind of 
intuitionism that hold and defend their position under that rubric."2  Thus, few moral 
philosophers claim to be intuitionists.     
While the use of intuition in philosophy is prevalent, there seem to be very 
few intuitionists.  Intuitionism fell out of favor around the time A.J. Ayer, an 
emotivist, published Language, Truth and Logic in 1936.  Since then, calling a 
philosopher an intuitionist has been sometimes tantamount to calling them something 
that is less than a rigorous philosopher.  
                                                 
2 Robert Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics,” in Moral Knowledge?: New 
Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (New York and 
Orford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 101. 
2 
 Intuitionism has taken a bad rap, unjustifiably burdened with objections that 
simply do not concern what the more plausible forms of intuitionism actually hold.  
Some objections concern the metaphysical views the intuitionists are reported as 
holding.  For example, J.L. Mackie argues that intuitionism necessarily entails the 
existence of implausible "queer entities" such as mind-independent moral properties 
that would necessarily be intrinsically action-guiding, motivating, and supervene on 
non-moral facts: something like Platonic forms.   
Epistemological projects involving intuition have burdens as well.  Thus, 
moral philosophers have called into question intuition's epistemological grounding.  
Some argue intuited beliefs are unjustifiable and/or held dogmatically.  Those 
involved in moral debates are sometimes reluctant to accept intuitions as rational 
justification.   
Despite the burdens of objections, many philosophers use intuition, albeit 
under some other guise.  Consider two examples: casuistry and principlism.   
Casuistry is case reasoning.  One decides what to do in any particular case by 
comparing that case to straightforward, easily adjudicated paradigm cases.  The 
paradigm case one's case most closely resembles illustrates the possible right courses 
of action to take.  The distinction among characteristics of a particular case and 
various paradigm cases can be quite fine.  In particular, qualitative and quantitative 
differences do not submit to straightforward criteria for adjudicating.  In situations 
where one's case is very similar to more than one paradigm case, the determination of 
which paradigm case one should follow seems greatly reliant on intuition. 
3 
 Principlism is similar in structure.  However, instead of comparing our cases 
to paradigm cases which show us what to do in a particular case, we apply principles 
to our cases.  Applied medical ethics uses the principles of autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and justice when deciding what to do in cases.  Intuition is used to 
decide which principle(s) applies or how to balance competing principles.  We may, 
alternatively, offer an argument to justify our decision for action. 
In ordinary moral discourse, intuition is often used as a sort of justification for 
one's argument or beliefs.  Consider the following claims that seem to invoke 
intuition as justification: 
"I just see things that way." 
"I suppose we have different intuitions and will just have to agree to 
disagree." 
"My gut tells me it's wrong/right." 
"It's obviously wrong/right." 
"It's just wrong to have sex with a chicken."3
  There are plethora of similar claims that invoke one's intuition as 
reason for one's adhering to a particular position.  Moral debates often turn on 
grounds of intuitions. 
 I distinguish, generally, the use of intuition in philosophical discourse into 
categories: Classic, Mediocre and Moderate Intuitionism.  Classic Intuitionism 
encompasses those philosophers who argue for some form of moral realism and that 
we have a faculty of intuition by which we apprehend mind-independent moral facts.  
                                                 
3 See Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helen Koller, and Maria G. Diaz, “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It 
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 65, No., 4 (1993), 613-
628.  They examine the reaction of Brazilians and Americans to a variety of harmless situations.  One 
of the situations they describe to respondents is the use of a chicken carcass for masturbation. 
4 
 Mediocre Intuitionists use intuition in making judgments, but do not make claims to 
Classic Intuitionist metaphysics: e.g., John Rawls.  Moderate Intuitionists attempt to 
reify the epistemological ends of Classic Intuitionists but do not claim that we 
indefeasibly grasp mind-independent moral facts or that intuitions are infallible. 
The significance of these observations is twofold: the faculty of intuition can 
be distinguished from the moral theory of intuitionism; and a faculty of intuition is 
often invoked, but neither well examined nor well understood.   
Preliminary Conception of Intuition 
Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., articulates what he takes to 
be intuitionists' general position:  "Writers who maintain that we have `intuitive 
knowledge' of the rightness of actions usually mean that this rightness is ascertained 
by simply 'looking at' the actions themselves, without considering their ulterior 
consequences."4  Distinguishing three phases of intuitionism, Sidgwick points out 
that there are Perceptual, Dogmatic, and Philosophical Intuitionism.  For Perceptual 
Intuitionism, the rightness of some particular action is immediately known (intuitions 
are directly grounded, similar to perceptions).  For Dogmatic Intuitionism, the general 
rules of Common Sense are accepted and applied axiomatically.  And, for 
Philosophical Intuitionism, the general dictates of Common Sense are accepted but 
there are still attempts to find a deeper explanation for these current rules.5  Later 
forms of ethical intuitionism reflect Sidgwick's phases of ethical intuitionism in that 
they usually entail three claims: 
                                                 
4 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company: 
1981), 96. 
5 Ibid., 98 – 104. For a brief history of intuitionism’s development, see Sidgwick’s footnote on page 
103 of The Methods of Ethics 7th ed. 
5 
 1.) There are many basic fundamental moral principles; these have independent grounds. 
2.) The basic fundamental moral principles indicate the structure of a mind-independent moral 
reality.  (We might consider it to be ontologically distinct.) 
3.)  Some people can have direct (epistemic) access to the mind-independent moral reality. 
The third of these claims can be evaluated independently.  Importantly, I 
distinguish the epistemological conception of intuition from the metaphysical 
commitments of moral realism.  Hence, I remain neutral in regard to the ontology of 
the moral universe and the existence of mind-independent moral facts.  Since 
intuitionism is commonly linked to moral realism, I begin my analysis of intuition 
with the Intuitionists.  I, however, remain neutral about the realism/antirealism 
debate.  I will assume that some form of cognitivism is true.  However, I do not 
commit myself to any particular version.  My emphasis is on the epistemological 
analysis of ethical intuitions.6   
Epistemological Components of Intuitive Knowledge 
A faculty of intuition can give us intuitive knowledge.  The following is the 
epistemological definition of intuitive knowledge. 
One has intuitive knowledge that p when 
1.) one's knowledge that p is immediate; 
2.) one's knowledge that p is self-evident; 
3.) one's knowledge that p is non-inferential; and  
4.) one's knowledge that p is not an instance of the operation of any of 
the five senses. 
                                                 
6 One might object that a characterization of intuition necessarily entails the metaphysical 
commitments of moral realism or other metaethical views (e.g., cognitivism).  However, we can 
understand and make arguments about the way that we think when we intuit.  We can study cognitions 
without having a firm account of what it is that we are cognizing.  For instance, we don’t need an 
account of protons and electrons to study the way that scientists comprehend, understand and think 
about them.  Likewise, we don’t need an account of mind-independent moral facts to study how it is 
that we cogitate about them. 
6 
 Robert Audi articulates a basic kind of self-evident proposition p, "p is self-
evident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for being justified in 
believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding."7  
Immediate apprehension of a proposition is direct.  Or, as H.A. Prichard puts it, "if 
there is to be such a thing as knowing that we know something, that knowing can be 
attained only directly, we in knowing the thing know directly, either at the same time 
or on reflection, that we are knowing it."8  Knowledge that is non-inferential is not 
inferred from other beliefs.  I will make more of these characteristics of intuitive 
knowledge below. 
Laurence BonJour offers a general account of the concept of intuition that is 
helpful for understanding what intuition entails.  BonJour writes that intuition is  
the intellectual act in which the necessity of  such a proposition is seen or grasped or 
apprehended as an act of rational insight or rational intuition (or, sometimes, a priori insight 
or intuition), where these phrases are mainly a way of stressing that such an act is seemingly 
(a) direct or immediate, non-discursive, and yet also (b) intellectual or reason-governed, 
anything but arbitrary or brute in character.9   
I approach intuition as a cognitive faculty, which performs the ‘act’ that 
BonJour calls rational insight.  However, I do not claim that intuition must be a 
faculty completely distinct from other cognitive faculties, though it may have some 
similarities.  G.E. Moore draws an analogy between the faculty of intuition and the 
                                                 
7 Robert Audi, “Self-evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999), 206.  Audi also articulates 
another formulation, “I construe the basic kind of self-evident proposition as (roughly) a truth such that 
any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (1) in virtue of having that understanding, one 
is justified in believing the proposition (i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact 
believes it or not); and (2) if one believes the proposition on the basis of that understanding of it, then 
one knows it” (206). 
8 H.A Prichard, Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 94. 
9 Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a priori Justification  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 102. 
7 
 faculty of perception.  This analogy is helpful insofar as it advances Moore's position.  
We should not understand it as paradigmatic of all accounts of intuition.  
Approaching intuition as a cognitive faculty does not commit one to admitting it is 
analogous to the faculty of perception nor that it is necessarily an independent faculty. 
To be clear, I'm using the term 'intuition' to denote the cognitive activity that 
we commonly call "intuition."  However, it is yet unclear if all instances that we term 
'intuitions' are the upshot of the same cognitive activities.  I use ‘intuition’ to refer to 
a particular cognitive activities that apparently produce intuitive knowledge. 
Intuitionist Epistemology: Structure of Justification 
 If moral propositions express moral beliefs, then how those beliefs are 
justified matters morally.  Foundationalist theories hold that for any belief x, x is 
justified if and only if x ultimately follows from some belief that is justified but not 
inferred from any other belief.10  Intuitionism attempts to foundationally justify moral 
beliefs.  Intuitionism's moral epistemology is an attempt to provide answers to 
foundationalist problems, e.g. how it is that we come to have foundational beliefs.  
Intuited fundamental moral propositions are foundational in the structure of justifying 
moral beliefs. 
Moral realists seek foundational justification for moral beliefs since 
foundational justification is consistent with how we experience that, for example, 
                                                 
10 Audi is instructive here, “the idea is that if one has any knowledge or justified belief, then first, one 
has at least some knowledge or justified belief that is foundational, in sense that it is not (inferentially) 
based on any further knowledge or belief and, second, any other knowledge or justified belief one has 
in some way rests on one or more of these foundational elements.” Robert Audi, The Architecture of 
Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality (Oxford University Press, 2001),  3.  
Foundationalism is often contrasted with coherentism.  Coherentist theories hold that each justified 
belief x is inferred (whether deductively, inductively, abductively, etc.) from some other belief y. 
8 
 recreational baby torture is wrong.  One just 'sees' that it is morally wrong.  Laurence 
BonJour says that these sorts of intuitions add credence to the plausibility of 
foundational justification.  He writes, "it certainly seems as though we have many 
beliefs that are justified, not via inference from other beliefs, but rather by sensory or 
introspective experience (and also a priori insight)."11   
Characteristics of intuitions are that they are self-evident and non-inferential.  
Thus, intuitions are reflective of the sorts of beliefs that are foundational in the 
structure of justification.  Coherentism does not capture the structure of justification 
that is consistent with common phenomena of moral experience.  We do not see it as 
a possibility that recreational baby torture could be acceptable, which might be the 
case under the coherence structures of justification since recreational baby torture 
would be morally acceptable if it coheres with other beliefs.   
Foundationalist grounding of moral belief gives realist arguments for morality 
a strong epistemic weight since our experience of 'wrong' is that 'it just seems wrong', 
which is reflective of a foundational justification for our belief that it actually is 
wrong.12
Audi and BonJour work to maintain intuitionism in a more moderate form 
than that of the Classic Intuitionists.  Much of their effort is devoted to maintaining 
the foundational character of intuitions.  They constitute 'non-inferential' very broadly 
                                                 
11 BonJour, 197. 
12 Audi speaks of epistemic weight.  He states, “evidential grounds retain epistemic weight even when 
overbalanced by counter-evidence and even when undermining evidence shows that they do not carry 
enough weight in the circumstances to sustain (overall) justification.” Robert Audi, The Good in the 
Right: A theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 21. 
9 
 in order to maintain that intuitive knowledge can be self-evident and thus 
foundational in its justification.  I make more of this issue in following sections.   
Intuition and Cognitive Science 
It seems obvious that intuition is a normal aspect of human cognition, not 
unlike how the rest of the mind works.  Approaching intuition as a cognitive faculty 
invites an empirically oriented approach to intuition.  Empirical study of the mind has 
potential to illuminate how conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves 
as intuition.  Karl Popper, however, argues of creative intuitions that, "There is no 
such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this 
process.  My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an 
irrational element,' or 'a creative intuition'."13  The empirical work that I present later 
in this project will contradict Popper's 1968 assumptions that there is not a logical 
reconstruction of the intuitive process.   
A recent development in the discipline of philosophy has been an emphasis on 
'Experimental Philosophy'.  Shawn Nichols is part of this movement.  He writes 
Researchers at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science have begun systematic 
exploration of folk concepts like wrong, knows, and refers.  There is nothing novel in wanting 
to characterize these concepts - that has been a preoccupation of philosophers for millennia.  
The novelty of the recent work lies in the appropriation of social scientific methodology to 
investigate what has heretofore been a largely a priori enterprise.  This work also has 
potentially wide ramifications for cognitive science since it's plausible that these concepts that 
have attracted philosophical attention also guide cognition in central domains like moral 
evaluation, mental state attribution, and semantic judgment.14    
                                                 
13 Karl Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 32. 
14 Shawn Nichols, “Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science,” Trends in 
Cognitive Science Vol. 8, No. 11 (November 2004), 514. 
10 
 Some philosophers might object that this sort of project belongs in the natural 
sciences and not the work of moral philosophers.  I beg to differ.  Just as it is 
necessary in ethics to be clear about the facts of the case, it is just as (if not more) 
important to be clear on the facts of how we arrive at judgments about that case.  
Moral thinking is a cognitive activity.  Cognitive activities are subject to empirical 
examination in ways they formerly have not been.  Philosophers would be naive to 
ignore such examinations. 
 Shawn Nichols and William Casebeer have produced projects that makes 
cognitive science relevant to moral philosophy.  In Sentimental Rules, Nichols uses 
cognitive science to argue for a Humean account of emotivism.15  Casebeer, in 
Natural Ethical Facts, uses a broad range of sciences, including cognitive science and 
evolutionary biology, to give an account of moral reasoning. 16  Thus, I'm not alone in 
thinking that science and moral philosophy are both important in answering questions 
about moral reasoning.  Moreover, a naturalized concept of intuition seems 
plausible.17  Michael Tye points out that 
                                                 
15 Shawn Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
16 William Casebeer, Natural Ethical Facts (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003). 
17 I will make the general claim that a naturalized conception of intuition is one that can be informed 
by the study of empirical science.  I make no claims here to reductivism or physicalism, though I do 
reserve the opportunity to take up those arguments.  This relates to naturalizing intentionality or as 
Thomas Bontly refers to it as ‘physicalizing intentionality’.  He is interested in the possibility of giving 
a physicalist/reductivist account of intentional relations, i.e. one’s relation to objects, properties, or 
facts that are represented as cognitive content; also an interesting take on ‘naturalizing’.  See Thomas 
Bontly, ”Should Intentionality be Naturalized?”, n Naturalism, Evolution and Mind: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 49: Proceedings of Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference held in 
Edinburgh, Scotland 1999, ed. D. M. Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43 – 60. 
11 
 [T]he mental is studied by psychology.  Psychology is a science no different in its procedures 
and laws from other sciences.  So of course, the mental is part of nature in ways  […] 
Naturalism with respect to the mental, once properly explicated, is really beyond question. 18
A caveat is necessary.  Science itself is fallible - and for many different 
reasons.  Thus, what science can reveal for philosophers should not be taken lightly, 
but, also, should not be accepted without scrutiny.  Cognitive science uses human 
behavior to study human cognition.  By hypothesizing hypothetical constructs, 
functions or mechanisms of the mind that are supposed to be responsible for the 
behaviors being tested, cognitive scientists may not be testing the function of 
cognition that is responsible for intuition.  Researchers may merely test part of the 
intuition's functioning.  Also of concern is that experiments and studies in cognitive 
science do not usually test realms of moral knowledge - if there are indeed 
ontologically distinct moral realms.  We may have a separate faculty of intuition that 
relates only to what we might call 'moral objects'.  However, if scientists study 
behavior, then, as far as behavior is linked to cognition, scientists can say something 
substantive about how the mind works in regard to making moral judgments.   
Several studies and papers in cognitive science offer evidence concerning 
intuition.  Particularly interesting is what can be said of immediacy, self-evidence and 
yield non-inferential knowledge ('non-inferentiality').  Moreover, it will be of interest 
to examine how cognitive science will weigh in on objections to intuitionism.    
As scientific theories about human cognitions change, so should philosophers' 
thoughts about how we arrive at judgments.  A healthy conversation between 
                                                 
18 Michael Tye, “Naturalism and the Mind,” Mind 101 (1992), 437. 
12 
 cognitive science and philosophy is due, and it is this conversation this project aims 
at. 
Outline of Thesis 
I will begin by examining some of the history of intuition in philosophical 
discourse: namely, the Classic Intuitionists G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A. 
Prichard. 19  I bring to light relevant distinctions among their conceptions of intuition.  
The explanation of an intuitive faculty in their philosophy has come to stand for the 
paradigm of intuition in moral philosophy.  Since my aim is to examine the concept 
of intuition, I will pay relatively little attention to other, though substantive, areas of 
their moral philosophies.  This is, however, unfortunate since each has influenced the 
development of moral thought.  In the section following, I will present the objections 
that call into question intuition.  I draw from Audi and BonJour since their respective 
projects attempt to deal with these same objections in an attempt to formulate 
respective Moderate Intuitionist positions.  I show how these objections raised against 
intuitionism are objections to the epistemological role of intuition.  After examining 
the objections, I present Mediocre Intuitionism and Moderate Intuitionism, both of 
which attempt to rearticulate the use of intuition in moral thinking in ways that are 
less objectionable. 20  I argue that both these conceptions of intuition are either moot, 
inadequate or incomplete.  Finally, I examine research in cognitive science and its 
bearing on developing a complete and adequate conception of intuition.  In particular, 
I look at how the results from empirical studies of intuition relate to criticisms and 
                                                 
19 There may be others in this group.  But, I offer these as paradigmatic of the group. 
20 In the following, I refer to ‘Moderate Rationalist,’ Laurence BonJour, and ‘Moderation Intuitionist,’ 
Robert Audi, as one group: Moderate Intuitionists.   
13 
 objections to intuitive knowledge.  These analyses point to a naturalized conception 
of intuition. 
14 
 Chapter 1 
The Classic Intuitionists 
Classic Intuitionists are G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, and W.D. Ross.  They 
attempted to show how moral knowledge can have foundational justification.  Each 
thought intuition was essential in identifying moral facts, arguing that morality is 
woven into the structure of the universe and that we have a faculty of intuition that, in 
some sense, could 'see' or apprehend moral facts.  Moral facts, or moral properties, 
are mind-independent.  They exist independently of anyone's apprehension of them.  
Thus, the Classic Intuitionists are moral realists.  Moral realism is to be contrasted 
with moral antirealism, which holds that there are no mind-independent moral facts.  
There are a number of metaethical positions that are considered antirealist: e.g., 
Ayer's emotivism.21   
Moral realism is a difficult position to defend since moral facts seem to be, as 
J.L. Mackie argues, metaphysically 'queer'.  The Classic Intuitionist's epistemological 
project, once divorced from its metaphysical entanglements, is salvageable.  
Important to untangling intuitionism is to distinguish the epistemic from the 
ontological commitments.  In the following sections, I outline the view of Classic 
Intuitionists and explain criticisms of their positions. 
G.E. Moore 
G.E. Moore, in Principia Ethica, presented arguments for metaethical claims: 
namely about the subject matter of ethics, moral semantics, moral metaphysics and 
                                                 
21 Ayer’s emotivism served to undermine the intuitionists metaphysical position concerning the 
existence of mind-independent moral facts.  Ayer argued that moral claims were expressions of one’s 
emotional disposition towards particular acts, more like expressions of opinions rather than statements 
of about facts. 
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 moral epistemology.22  Moore thought that the notions of goodness and badness were 
the most basic moral concepts; other moral terms such as rightness, wrongness and 
virtue are definable by them.  Moore's influence on the semantics of ethics is 
recognizable even now.  He famously made the "Open-Question Argument," arguing 
that reductive accounts of the good that attempt to define 'good' by some other 
normative or non-normative term would fail since 'good' is "simple," "unanalyzable" 
and "non-natural."  Moral properties conceived thusly avoid the pitfalls of what 
Moore calls the "Naturalistic Fallacy."23
Moore's metaphysics entailed a sort of moral realism.  Roughly, Moore held 
that there are moral properties that exist independently of the beliefs, concepts, and 
dispositions of individuals or groups of individuals.  Moore's non-naturalism rested 
upon the claim that morality, e.g. 'goodness', could not be the subject matter of 
empirical science.  The naturalized conception of intuition that I argue for here and 
Moore's non-naturalism do not conflict.  Moore's claim was about the content of 
moral discourse, i.e. that normative terms were ontologically different from non-
normative terms.  I do not make claims to the contrary.  My arguments concern the 
way in which we apprehend those terms: Our thinking, understanding and 
apprehending of morality can be the subject of natural science.  
                                                 
22 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds.), “Introduction,” in Metaethics after Moore (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 1. 
23 When we attempt to identify normative terms like ‘good’ with natural kind terms like pleasure, 
Moore argues that we commit the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy” since saying, e.g. ‘x is pleasurable’ is not the 
same thing to say ‘x is good’.  Moreover, such claims are subject to the “Open-Question” Argument 
since we can still ask ‘Is it good that pleasure is good?’ (“Is it good that it is good that pleasure is 
good?” etc. etc.). 
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 Moore argued that moral properties are non-natural and simple.  Good, qua 
moral property, is simple since it is not composed of more basic parts.  Moral 
properties are non-natural properties since they cannot be the study of empirical 
sciences.  Intuition yields knowledge of simple, non-natural moral properties.  That 
good is simple and non-natural evidences the fact that it is also unanalyzable since 
there is, in essence, nothing left to say of a simple property.  Moreover, its non-
naturalness precludes it from empirical inspection.  Despite being simple, non-natural 
and unanalyzable, we still seem to have knowledge of moral properties.   
For Moore, intuitive knowledge occurs 'in us' in much the same way that the 
faculty of perception yields knowledge.  We visually perceive yellow and hence 
know 'yellow'.  Likewise, Moore maintains that we have a faculty of intuition that in 
some sense 'sees' good.  Intuitive knowledge is foundational, and similar justification 
is attributed to knowledge from visual perceptions.  We do not infer 'yellow' from 
other facts or properties.  We see that something is 'yellow', which provides 
foundational justification for our belief that it is yellow.  Moral properties are grasped 
by intuition in the same way: we just 'see', in an intuitional sense, that some act is, 
e.g., 'good'. 
Moore distinguishes two classes of intuited propositions, distinguished by 
what makes them incapable of proof or disproof.24  In regard to what makes an 
                                                 
24 He says, “In order to express the fact that ethical propositions of my first class are incapable of proof 
or disproof, I have sometimes followed Sidgwick’s usage in calling them ‘Intuitions.’  But I beg it may 
be noticed that I am not an ‘Intuitionist,’ in the ordinary sense of term.  […]  The Intuitionist proper is 
distinguished by maintaining that proposition of my second class propositions which assert that a 
certain action is right or a duty – are incapable of proof or disproof by any enquiry into the results of 
such actions.  I, on the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not 
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 ethical proposition intuitively known, Moore stresses, "I mean merely to assert that 
they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as the manner or origin of our 
cognition of them."25   
W.D. Ross 
Ross, probably the best-known intuitionist, attempts to systematize our 
common sense ideas about duties.  He articulates his Intuitionism in The Foundations 
of Ethics and The Right and the Good. 26  He argues that our basic moral duties of 
fidelity, reparation, gratitude, non-maleficence, and justice (i.e. promotion of the 
good) are known to some persons of "sufficient mental maturity" by intuiting 
fundamental moral propositions.   
According to Ross, there is a "system of moral truth, as objective as all truth 
must be." 27  Ross understood this system of moral truth to provide irreducible 
plurality of moral grounds that support our duties.  This was obvious to Ross since 
there seems to be no one ground for one's self-evidently realized duties. 28
One comes to grasp the fundamental moral propositions expressing our duties 
with experience and over time.  Those propositions are self-evident.  Ross writes in 
The Right and the Good, 
                                                                                                                                           
‘Intuitions,’ than to maintain that propositions of my first class are Intuitions.” G.E. Moore, Principia 
Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), x. 
25 Ibid. 
26 W.D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics; the Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 
1935-6 (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1939); and W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ed. Philip 
Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002). 
27 Ross, The Right and the Good, 15. 
28 For example, I have a direct duty both to make those around me less miserable and to ensure that the 
society is a just one.  There are a number of direct duties that I may have of which none is superior to 
others.  Note, however, one could argue that even if duties have differential grounds, duties can be 
systematized.  B.C. Postow, “A Partial Application Procedure for Ross’s Ethical Theory,” Journal of 
Philosophical Research, 31 (2006), 239-248. 
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 [General principles of duty] come to be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do.  
We find by experience that this couple of matches and that couple make four matches, that 
this couple of balls on a wire and that couple make four balls: and by reflection on these and 
similar discoveries we come to see that it is of the nature of two and two to make four.  In a 
precisely similar way, we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the 
fulfillment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another 
promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we 
apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment of a promise. 29  
Ross argues that through experience one comes to recognize that particular 
sorts of situations contain certain duties in the same way as in other situations we 
recognize instantiations of mathematical axioms.  Through intuition, we see that these 
are our prima facie duties; these duties are self-evident.  Thus, the apprehension of 
mind-independent moral facts by intuition gives moral knowledge of the mind-
independent system of moral reality.   
Self-evident moral propositions apprehended by intuition require no other 
justification for their truth than that they are apprehended and understood.  However, 
that does not entail that they are, as Moore claims, 'beyond proof.'  One can offer 
reasons for accepting that our prima facie duties are true without invoking intuition: 
i.e., some things might be knowable both through intuition and in other ways, such as 
by inference or argument. 
The rightness or wrongness of a particular act is part of the mind-independent 
moral order of the universe: there is some moral quality, character or property that is 
apparent to us, that quality or character exists objectively, and has some normative 
moral force.  In the Foundations of Ethics and The Right and the Good, Ross argues 
that we do not perceive rightness (or wrongness) directly.  "Rightness is always a 
                                                 
29 Ross, The Right and the Good, 32-3. 
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 resultant attribute, an attribute that an act has because it has another attribute."  30   
Rightness is always a part of the act considered in toto.  It is contained in the act itself 
and the effects to which it is causally connected (construed broadly).  The rightness of 
my saving a child's life is connected not only the act of saving the child, but that I 
save the child and that child does not grow up to murder hundreds of people.  For if it 
was the case that I save a child and the child turns out to be a mass murder, my act 
would be proportionally less right. 31  I, however, still have the duty to save the child, 
but I also have the duty to prevent the suffering of all those that the child will kill. 
Ross is an ethical pluralist.  For him, there are several prima facie duties that 
apply to any particular situation. 32  To choose which duty we follow is an attempt to 
choose our actual duty.  However, "Our judgments about our actual duty in concrete 
situations have none of the certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general 
principle of duty." 33  One's belief is justified when it is an expression of knowledge 
that is either self-evident or a valid conclusion of self-evident premises.  Beliefs about 
the rightness of one's act do not have either of these criteria.  Ross's Intuitionism does 
not claim to be able to decide with any certainty what to do in hard cases.   Ross bites 
the bullet, accepting that we may judge wrongly about what duty we are supposed to 
act on in a particular situation.  This is a bit alarming; however, Ross notes, "we are 
                                                 
30 Ross, The Foundations of Ethics, 168. 
31 The example I use may be exaggerating the relevance of the consequences to the rightness of the act.  
However, that consequences are included as part of what makes acts right or wrong seems to be what 
Ross is saying in The Foundations of Ethics.  See pg. 183-191.   
32 “Goodness is a resultant attribute; it belongs to anything to which it does belong, because of the 
nature of the thing in some respect or other – because, for instance, it is a brave or not cowardly act.  
And while even the vaguest apprehension of the goodness or badness of anything depends on some 
previous insight into the nature of the thing, an apprehension of the degree of its goodness will depend 
on close study of its nature, upon which the apprehension of the degree of its goodness supervenes, not 
as a logical conclusion but as a psychological result” (Ibid., 184). 
33 Ross, The Right and the Good, 30. 
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 more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the best of our ability on the prima facie 
rightness or wrongness of various possible acts in virtue of the characteristics we 
perceive them to have, than if we act without reflection.  With this greater likelihood 
we must be content."34
H.A. Prichard 
In "What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?", Prichard's concern is not only 
how we come to have knowledge of moral principles but how those principles relate 
to moral motivation.35  It could be the case that one might have knowledge of moral 
principles, know them self-evidently, but fail to act or to see that one should act on 
them.  Prichard points out, however, that this is not how we experience moral 
obligations.   
Prichard examines the following sorts of moral principles (for action): 
"'Because I ought to stimulate any higher part of my nature,' or 'because I ought to do 
any old friend a service which I alone can render' or 'because I ought to pay anything 
I owe or have promised to pay'." 36  He finds that these principles admit of no other 
reason for their being true than "that anyone must either recognize the truth of the 
principle directly, i.e. as self-evident, or fail to see it altogether.  This implies not only 
that a further reason is not forthcoming but that it is not needed, the reason lying 
within the principle itself." 37     
                                                 
34 Ibid., 32. 
35 H.A. Prichard, “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?” Moral Writings, ed. Jim Mac Adam 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002). 
36 Ibid, 4. 
37 Ibid. 
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 Prichard also holds that a principle's self-evidence is immediate:  "[T]hat I 
have promised to pay a man so much is the reason why I ought to pay it, i.e. the 
connexion [sic] between the obligation to pay and my having promised is immediate, 
i.e. that the one directly necessitates the other, as the straightness of a line necessitates 
its being the shortest way between its ends." 38  Immediate apprehension directly 
necessitating one's obligation, Prichard argues, is fundamental in moral deliberation.  
That some other ground can be provided for our feeling of rightness is not necessary 
to justify that moral principles are true. 39   Prichard writes: 
We recognize, for instance, that this performance of a service to X, who has  done us a 
service, just in virtue of its being the performance of a service to one who has rendered a 
service to the would-be agent, ought to be done by us.  This apprehension is immediate, in 
precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate, e.g., the apprehension 
that this three-sided figure, in virtue of its being three-sided, must have three angles.  Both 
apprehensions are immediate in the sense that in both insights into the nature of the subject 
directly leads us to recognize its possession of the predicate; and it is only stating this fact 
from the other side to say that in both cases the fact apprehended is self-evident. 40
Prichard argues that there are two ways of apprehending: reflectively and 
directly.  Directly apprehending our moral obligations, which motivate agents to act, 
is, on Prichard's account, an act of intuition.  "The sense that we ought to do certain 
things arises in our unreflective consciousness, being an activity of moral thinking 
occasioned by the various situations in which we find ourselves." 41  Moral 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 In regard to justification of intuited principles Prichard writes:  
If, e.g., we refer to the act of repaying X by a present merely as giving X a present, it appears, 
and indeed is, necessary to give a reason.  In other words, wherever a moral act is regarded in 
this incomplete way the question “Why should I do it?” is perfectly legitimate.  This fact 
suggests, but suggests wrongly, that even if the nature of the act is completely stated, it is still 
necessary to give a reason, or, in other words, to supply a proof.  H.A. Prichard, “Does Moral 
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 81 (January, 1912), 28. 
40 Ibid., 28. 
41 Ibid., 36. 
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 obligations are apprehended directly, yet, when the demand to justify these 
obligations is placed on the agent, he will be at a loss to offer the same proof to 
others.  The proof is that moral obligations are directly apprehended.  One may, 
however, by an act of reflective consciousness "realize the self-evidence of our 
obligations, i.e., the immediacy of our apprehension of them." 42  One can show that 
they are true only so far as we can show that they have the property of being self-
evident.  One cannot offer the same proof as when intuitions are derived from 
unreflective consciousness. 
Like Ross, Prichard is a pluralist.  There is no single ground from which all 
principles are deduced.  A single ground would yield only one kind of duty. 43  It 
seems obvious to Prichard that there are multiple kinds of duties or obligations that 
we have, given our relative dispositions in regard to different individuals and various 
circumstances. 
Prichard argues that once one finds that one has a particular obligation by 
virtue of one's relation to a situation, one then sees that this obligation can be held 
elsewhere.  "Hence we do not deduce the particular obligation from the principle 
apprehended first.  We first recognize the particular obligation and then by reflection 
on it discover the principle, i.e. formulate to ourselves that general character of the act 
which render, it, or any act like it, an obligation."44   
Prichard on conflicting obligations is pragmatic.  He holds that when we do 
have obligations that conflict, we should notice "(a) that obligations admit of degrees, 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 This point might be made better by contrasting a plurality of grounds for moral principles with the 
singular ground that John Stuart Mill uses: the maximization of utility. 
44 Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, 5. 
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 (b) that in a case of conflict the question is simply 'Which obligation is the greater?', 
(c) that in the end the question can only be answered by our immediate recognition, 
when all the circumstances have been taken into account, that one is the greater or the 
greatest, (d) that the problem is often one of extreme difficulty, but (e) that in any 
case there is no general criterion for solving it."45  Here too, similar to Ross, we see  
that Prichard bites the bullet on how to decide difficult cases. 
Summary of Classic Intuitionist Positions Regarding Intuition 
The Classic Intuitionists argue that intuition yields intuitive knowledge.  
Intuitive knowledge is, in some sense, self-evident, immediate, non-inferential, and 
not derived from the five senses. 46  Each intuitionist may hold a slightly different 
account of what these characteristics entail.  I shall now point out these differences 
and the related problem of 'understanding'. 
Self-evidence 
Moore argued that self-evident propositions are beyond proof or disproof, i.e., 
that no argument can be offered that would show their truth or falsity.  Moore 
distinguished reasons for propositions being true, "logical reason," from the reasons 
for holding a proposition to be true. 47  A proposition whose truth is contained in 
itself, not inferred from other propositions, is logically true, which is different from 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 The standard five senses play some sort of role in the apprehensions of intuition.  Experience seems 
necessary for anyone to understand what it is that they are intuiting.  Experience plays the role 
allowing agents to gain the background knowledge necessary for understanding the contents of intuited 
propositions.  Ross and Prichard seem to hold this view: Moore less so since experience and 
background knowledge seems less relevant for agents intuiting self-evident propositions.  Moore 
grounds intuited propositions less in the epistemology of apprehended mind-independent moral facts 
and more in the ontological properties he argues they must have: namely that they are simple, non-
natural and unanalyzable.   
47 Audi uses the terms “ontic reasons” in The Good and the Right, 13.   
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 holding that the proposition is true because it has these properties or because that one 
has apprehended it as having these properties. 48  Prichard holds a similar 
epistemological position.  Prichard argues that principles admit of no other reason for 
their truth than that one "must either recognize the truth of the principle directly, i.e. 
as self-evident, or fail to see it altogether."49  Prichard is consistent with Moore 
concerning self-evident apprehension.  Both hold that intuition is the only way to 
recognize the self-evident truth of moral principles (as opposed to recognizing that a 
proposition is true because it is self-evident).  Contra Moore, Ross argues that some 
other argument can be given concerning the truth of a proposition, even if the 
proposition cannot be grasped intuitively.  Ross must, however, admit that if 
fundamental moral propositions are not grasped intuitively, even if the can be, one 
will not have foundational grounds for believing those positions are true.   
Immediacy 
It is necessary to distinguish senses of immediacy since they are sometimes 
confused, equivocated, or just overlooked.  The epistemological sense of immediacy 
has to do with the directness of apprehension: arriving at the truth of some 
proposition is not the consequence of a process.  The phenomenological sense of 
immediacy is a change that occurs instantaneously or quickly, relating to temporality.  
Our experience of having an intuition may be that the solution appears to us to be 
                                                 
48 Audi argues that Moore does not actually hold the position that self-evident propositions are beyond 
proof since Moore thought there could be reasons for hold the proposition to be true apart from the 
logical reason for its being true.  However, Audi misconstrues Moore’s point about reasons.  Reasons 
provide justification for believing.  These are the reasons that Audi refers to as “evidential reasons” 
(Audi, The Good and the Right, pg. 13.)  That the truth of a proposition is necessarily contained within 
its content provides justification for our believing it to be true but it does not provide another sort of 
proof for it being true. 
49 Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, 36. 
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 immediate and direct in the phenomenological sense, yet the proposition may not in 
fact be epistemologically direct.50  
As I understand Ross, he emphasizes that intuition occurs immediately, 
sometimes only after a long period of coming to grasp the content or meaning of 
propositions.  The act of coming to understand the contents of a self-evident 
proposition may take some time; however, the intuiting is itself epistemologically and 
phenomenologically immediate.  As I understand Moore and Prichard, they take 
similar positions in regard to immediacy; however, they do not emphasize that one 
may need to reflect on or think about a proposition to apprehend it.  Self-evident 
propositions are apprehended immediately, in both the epistemic and 
phenomenological sense.  
'Non-inferentiality' 
 Moore, Prichard and Ross agree that intuited knowledge is neither inferred 
from the five senses nor from other beliefs.  The understanding of intuited 
propositions delivers (directly) the truth of the proposition, without inference.  One 
might have to obtain a certain quantity or set of experiences to understand the content 
of the propositions.  Nevertheless, the meaning of terms is not taken as derived or 
inferred from the senses.  Understanding a self-evident proposition in no way entails 
the use of inference to arrive at the truth of the proposition.  Moore makes this point 
more apparent when drawing the analogy between perception and intuition.  Intuitive 
                                                 
50  Some unconscious processing that is stepwise may be occurring ‘under the surface’, as I show later 
when I present data from cognitive science.  Thusly, epistemologically, there is no directness, but 
phenomenologcially, we have the experience of directness.  One may also hold a belief occurrently and 
that belief be immediate, in the epistemological sense.  A proposition may be immediately known, in 
the epistemological sense, but not instantaneous since change from a non-belief state to holding a 
dispositional belief may take a relatively long period of time, but not be the result of inference. 
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 knowledge is not derived from the senses, but, in a similar way, is apprehending by 
'seeing'.   
… the Remaining Problem 
 What is problematic for Ross and Prichard is the relationship between 'self-
evidence' and 'understanding'.  Fundamental moral propositions that are self-evident 
are also non-inferential.  However, that not everyone intuits these propositions - 
supposedly since not everyone understands them in the relevant way - leads us to 
question how and why we understand them in a particular way.  'Understanding', thus, 
is particular to a (perhaps broad) set of experiences.  Hence, apprehending particular 
self-evident propositions is, in some sense, dependent on a set of experiences (as far 
as that set of experiences is required for 'understanding')  This leads me to wonder if 
one must infer from those experiences to grasp the truth of the propositions.  If such 
an inference is indeed involved in the apprehension, then those propositions are no 
longer self-evident.  What intuitionism requires is an adequate understanding of 
'understanding'.  BonJour and Audi attempt to rectify this problem by construing 
'understanding' and non-inferentiality more broadly.  Their broad conception of 
understanding allows that the meaning of propositions is entailed or contained within 
the proposition itself.  I will take this up below when I address the Moderate 
Intuitionists and cognitive science. 
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 Chapter 2 
 
Problems for Classic Intuitionism: The Epistemological Burdens of Intuition 
The following are objections to intuition commonly attributed to Classic 
Intuitionism.  Any plausible intuitionism must deal with these objections.  I am not 
interested in the metaphysical project of substantiating the existence of mind-
independent moral facts.  Thus, the objections are geared to present the 
epistemological burdens of an intuitive faculty.51  I present them in short and then lay 
them out more explicitly, where appropriate, as I present responses to the objections. 
(1) The Dissensus Objection: Intuitions as far as they are self-evident are 
implausible since if basic principles of ethics are self-evident, there would not 
be so much disagreement over what they are.52  Disagreement may come on 
two counts: what one person holds as self-evident either (a) fails to seem self-
evident to a second person; or (b) is in conflict with some proposition another 
person sees as rationally self-evident.53
(2) The 'Non-Discursive' Objection: Intuition is un-evaluable since it has no 
steps or functions to evaluate for adequacy.54
(3) The Dogmatic Objection: Intuition is "subjectively compelling" even 
when it is the product of bias: emotional or intellectual.55  
                                                 
51 J.L Mackies ‘Argument from Queerness’ in a widely cited objection to Intuitionism.  See J.L. 
Mackie, “The Subjectivity of Values,” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). However, his objection concerns the metaphysics of mind-
independent moral facts and our ability to know them.  My concern here is the epistemology of the 
faculty of intuition.  As far as such a faculty is able to be the study of empirical science, I am able to 
avoid his objection. 
52 Audi, The Good in the Right, 60. 
53 BonJour, 138. 
54 Ibid., 131. 
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  (4) The Meta-justification Problem: Intuitionists are unable to provide 
meta-justification, "a second-order reason or justification for thinking that 
accepting rational insight [intuition] or apparent self-evidence is at least likely 
to lead to believing the truth."56
(5) The Causal Objection: There is no causal relation between an intuited 
belief that p and the object or situation to which p pertains.57  
(6) The External Criterion Problem: Establishing independent criteria for 
intuition to provide reliable beliefs is "inherently futile."58
BonJour and Audi do a decent job of responding to these objections.  
Nevertheless, more can be said in reply to their positions when we elucidate the 
cognitive functioning of intuitions.  Thus, showing how an intuitive faculty functions 
can offer something to be said for each of the above objections.  In the following, I 
offer replies to these objections and examine the Moderate Intuitionist positions of 
Audi and BonJour, who attempt to reconcile Classic Intuitionism with its objectors.  
Each of these objections in some way challenges the characteristics of intuitive 
knowledge (self-evidence, immediacy, and 'non-inferentiality'): The Dissensus 
Objection, Dogmatic Objection, and External Criterion Problem relate to issues 
concerning self-evidence, while The 'Non-Discursive' Objection, Meta-justification 
Problem and Causal Objection relate to the immediacy and that intuitive knowledge is 
                                                                                                                                           
55 “What is to prevent any person who is emotionally biased or intellectually dogmatic from regarding 
a claim that seems subjectively compelling to him as a product of such insight [intuition]?” (Ibid.). 
56 Ibid., 143. 
57 Ibid., 156.  Alexander Miller makes a similar objection.  He argues that moral realists are 
“epistemologically bankrupt”: moral facts are not causally related to the beliefs we purport to have of 
them.  Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2003), 35-6. 
58 BonJour, 136. 
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 non-inferential.  However, Audi and BonJour's replies are inadequate.  After 
explaining the Intuitionist responses to these objections, I, in the following sections, 
turn to cognitive science in an attempt to buttress intuition against these inadequacies. 
Replies to the Objections to Classic Intuitionism 
The Dissensus Objection 
Two instances of dissensus are problematic for self-evident intuitions: (1) a 
proposition that is self-evident to one person fails to seem self-evident to a second 
person; and (2) a self-evident proposition is in conflict with some proposition another 
person sees as rationally self-evident.  (2) is further divided: (a) there could be a 
conflict over which self-evident moral principle should be followed since the ends 
which they prescribe are mutually inconsistent; (b) there could be an apparent logical 
contradiction between self-evident propositions.   
We might describe (2a) cases in Ross's terminology: there is a conflict 
between two individuals over which prima facie duty should be the actual duty.  In 
(2b) cases, the logical contradiction is such that one could not consistently hold that 
both propositions are true at the same time: e.g., one could not consistently hold that 
both A and ~A are true propositions. 
 Ross bites the bullet in (2a) set of dissensus cases.  These are disagreements 
about how one's prima facie duties should be acted upon.  Since there are a plurality 
of grounds for the prima facie duties, there is not a single principle or overarching 
framework from which they are derived.  Without a principle or framework to 
adjudicate over what duty ought to be one's actual duty, there is room for practical 
disagreement over what prima facie duty is one's actual duty in cases where more 
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 than prima facie duty applies.  These are practical disagreements over how Rossian 
intuitionism ought to be applied.  I have little interest in these issues for this project.59   
I am, however, interested in (2b) sets of cases.  In these cases, agents disagree 
over which of the contradictory self-evident propositions are self-evident.  The 
disagreement concerns the notion of self-evidence itself.  BonJour argues that such 
dissensus is resolvable through discourse over a shared set of premises or by 
reflecting on actual cases.  "Thus it is simply not true that the absence of relevant 
shared premises must result in either stalemate or the employment of non-rational 
means of persuasion."60  By either becoming more clear on the meaning of the 
contents of the proposition or considering the proposition more broadly, as situated in 
context, both parties will come to some sort of agreement.  Notice that the dialogue is 
not over the nature of the self-evidence, but over some other set of premises that 
would alternatively justify the proposition.  How far this maintains their non-
inferential character is questionable.  That self-evident intuitions are non-inferential 
leads to another objection, The 'Non-Discursive' Objection. 
Alternatively, we might chalk (1) and (2b) cases up as Ross does to the lack of 
adequate understanding of the meaning of the contents of the proposition.  Thus, 
when the second agent comes to understand the proposition she will recognize the 
truth entailed by its self-evidence.  I think that this sort of reply makes light of the 
objection.    
                                                 
59 Audi, in The Good and the Right, argues that combining a Rossian Intuitionism and Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative can systematize the basic fundament moral principle of Rossian Intuitionism. 
60 BonJour, 140. 
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 Audi draws our attention to a number of ways to understand self-evidence: 
immediately self-evident vs. mediated self-evident; conclusions of inference vs. 
conclusions of reflection; and rational intuitionism vs. empirical intuitionism.  
Immediately self-evident propositions are those that are "readily understood by 
normal adults (or by people of some relevant description, e.g. the mentally mature 
Ross spoke of)."61  Mediately self-evident propositions differ in that "their truth can 
be grasped by such people only through the mediation of reflection."62  Audi, 
however, does not construe this sort of mediated reflection as offering inferential 
justification.  Rather, this sort of reflection reaches "the kind of understanding 
required to see the truth of the proposition 'in itself'."63  Mediately self-evident 
proposition are not conclusions of inference: they are not "premised on propositions 
noted as evidence."64  They constitute a kind of conclusion of reflection: it comes 
about after thinking about the object intuited as a whole.  There are no premises upon 
which the truth of the proposition is based.65    
                                                 
61 Audi, The Good and the Right, 51. 
62 Ibid., 51. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 45. 
65 Ibid.  Note: Conceived thusly, the dissensus (2a) sets of cases seems more interesting.  If the 
proposition in question is not mediately self-evident, but immediately self-evident (or, more 
problematicly, obviously self-evident), then the dissensus is not explained by the mere lack of 
reflective understanding.  Consider the following: ‘If no philosophers are women, then no women are 
philosophers.’  The antecedent and consequent are false; thus, the conditional is true.  This proposition 
is immediately self-evident to seasoned introductory logic instructors.  The logic instructor understands 
this immediately without reflection.  For her, the structure of the proposition delivers its truth.  
However, many introductory logic students do not understand the proposition is this way.  They 
understand merely that ‘no philosophers are women’ is false since there must obviously be women 
philosophers and, similarly, ‘no women are philosophers’ is false.  With this understanding, the 
proposition is false.  Their empirically oriented understanding of the situation to which the proposition 
pertains is veridical with the way they understand the proposition: ‘Something that contains no 
utterance of truth, certainly cannot be true’.  At the very least, the proposition is not self-evident to the 
introductory logic student.  Ultimately, however I think that the examples point out the same thing as 
we will see in as important in (2b) sorts of cases.  That is, the unexamined role of ‘understanding’. 
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    The dissensus conceived thusly can occur in the following cases: (a) one 
agent apprehends immediately the self-evident proposition and the other fails to 
apprehend it immediately and mediately; (b) one agent apprehends immediately the 
self-evident proposition and the other fails to apprehend immediately , but attempts a 
mediate route to self-evidence, fails, and argues the failure is evidence that the 
proposition is not indeed self-evident; and, (c) one agent apprehends the mediate self-
evidence and the second agent fails to see that the proposition is self-evident at all - 
that the proposition is only 'mediately self-evident' is reason for distrusting that it is 
actually self-evident. 
There does not seem to be a way to adjudicate what sort of self-evidence, 
immediate or mediated, is appropriate for any particular proposition.  Though, I think, 
Audi would simply argue that all self-evident propositions are open to both ways of 
apprehending.  In this way, any immediately self-evident proposition can be 
understood as mediately self-evident since entailed by their being self-evident is that 
their truth is contained within the contents of the proposition itself.  Thus, 
understanding is a condition for self-evidence and that condition obtains in either case 
of self-evidence: immediately or mediately. 
 I think Audi's answer is incomplete.  It is obvious that mediately apprehended 
intuitions entail some sort of mental process that leads one to intuitive 
apprehension.66  Audi's supposition that the resulting intuitive knowledge is a result 
of mere "understanding," "reflection," and "thinking" lacks the explanatory power to 
                                                 
66 The same can be said for immediately apprehended self-evident propositions; though, it is not in the 
same way obvious since if propositions are apprehended directly, there need not be reflective 
understanding entailed by the apprehension of the proposition. 
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 describe what cognitions are occurring when a proposition is intuitively apprehended.  
I present empirical evidence in the next chapters that, to a greater extent, explains 
these cognitive processes. 
The 'Non-Discursive' Objection 
Intuitions have the character of being non-inferential, immediate, and direct.  
Thus, the process by which one arrives at self-evidence cannot be evaluated in a 
reflective way.  I cannot turn back on my own or another's intuitive apprehension that 
a proposition is true in order to analyze for adequacy the process by which one arrives 
at truth.  There are no premises, rules, or appeal to any sorts of criteria by which one 
comes to have an intuition.  There are no relations amongst premises or relations of 
premises to conclusions that can be evaluated.  Thus, intuitions are non-discursive.  
Hence, many intuitionists are charged with being dogmatic since those who hold 
intuitions cannot offer reasons for why their intuiting of a proposition is correct.  
Not all instances of arriving at intuitive knowledge lack other reasons for the 
correctness of one's intuitive apprehension.  Audi construes intuition broadly as 
encompassing not only the immediately self-evident, but also the mediately self-
evident.  There seems some room for justifying one's mediate intuition even if it has 
the character of being non-discursive.  If the intuition is immediate and direct, then 
evaluation is not likely.  If the evaluation is of the mediately self-evident proposition, 
then one can evaluate how it is one came to understand the contents of the 
proposition.  One is still unable to evaluate the realization of the self-evident truth.  
What is evaluated is the process of one's coming to realize.  For example, I might 
explain how I came to understand the proposition x, by virtue of that understanding I 
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 arrive at the self-evidence of the proposition.  I can explain to another how I arrived 
at the understanding of x.  However, I am still not able to explain how that 
understanding gives to me x's self-evidence.   
Also, if it can be shown that an intuition is not dogmatic or in some other way 
biased, then we have more reason for believing that it is correct.  However, cognitive 
science's empirical examination of the cognitive processes will show whether the 
cognition that we attribute non-discursive character to is actually direct and 
immediate. 
The Dogmatic Objection 
What is to distinguish an 'intuition' resulting from dogmatic belief or personal 
bias from an authentic intuition?  BonJour notes of inauthentic intuitions that "despite 
seeming clearly and obviously true, they will [almost always] not seem necessary in 
the relevant sense," even to those having them.67  Consider BonJour's example:  
"while a mother's emotional bias may lead her to regard her own child better-behaved 
than other children, she is extremely unlikely to regard this fact as metaphysically 
necessary."68  Presumably, sufficient self-reflection will reveal beliefs held on the 
grounds of personal bias.    
 One solution is to establish a set of criteria for having intuitive beliefs that are 
not biased or dogmatic.  However, BonJour objects that any criteria would be 
established via empirical methods and hence undermine the a priori character of 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 135. 
68 Ibid. 
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 authentic intuitions.69  Applying criteria to intuitive apprehensions does not eliminate 
the possibility of intuitive knowledge outright - just the fully a priori intuition the 
rationalist pursues.70   
 BonJour points out that we may not always identify biased or dogmatic 
intuitions.  However, we are aware of personal biases of individuals.  It seems in 
these cases we are normally wary of the intuitive knowledge that others offer when it 
is consistent with their personal biases.  We are wary of the Catholic's intuitions about 
abortion and of Hitler's intuitions about 'the right direction for Germany'.  Careful re-
examination of intuitions via internal reflection and third party consensus will help 
eliminate inauthentic intuitions.  We may not capture all erroneous intuitions in this 
manner, but given time and suitable reflection most will be weeded out.  Moreover, 
the possibility of authentic a priori intuition is still left open.   
The Meta-justification Problem 
The Meta-justification Problem argues that a "a second-order reason or 
justification" is needed to make us think that self-evidence is "likely at least to lead to 
believing the truth."  Intuitions are immediate (direct), non-inferential and self-
evident; thus they cannot offer other reason(s) for thinking they are true.   
Audi distinguishes between first-order intuitions, understanding that a 
proposition is true (non-inferentially); and, second-order intuitions, understanding 
that a proposition is self-evident and as such is non-inferential and is true in itself.  
                                                 
69 Thus a rationalist view of a priori justification plainly cannot appeal in this way to an independent 
criterion in order to solve the present problem” (Ibid., 135-6.). 
70 This poses another dilemma for this project, The External Criterion Problem, which I take up later.   
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 Intuition conceived thusly offers second-order justification for believing our intuition 
that a proposition is true, i.e. because it is self-evident. 
Audi seems to present meta-justification for intuited beliefs.  However, a 
better account of the processes involved in intuition would offer other second-order 
reasons for thinking that the intuitive apprehension is correct.  Cognitive science can 
offer an  account of processes involved in intuition.  This more robust account will 
serve as a better template for evaluating and offering justification that intuitions are 
correct.  Moreover, a criteria for meta-justification may also help eliminate those 
intuitions that are the result of dogmatically held beliefs or bias.   
The Causal Objection 
Alexander Miller's argument that moral realists are "epistemologically 
bankrupt" points out that moral facts are not causally related to the beliefs we purport 
to have of them.71  In other words, seeing (the fact) that burning a cat is wrong cannot 
be epistemologically justified.72  The sort of moral property the moral realist 
                                                 
71 Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2003), 35-6.  Intuition is supposed to give us epistemic access to moral facts, which is supposed to 
provide justification for our believing them.  Intuition is the explanation for how intuited belief 
manifest.  Miller argues that intuition could be defended in two ways: 
(A) We are justified in having beliefs about moral facts since intuition has the capacity for 
making correct moral judgments; and  
(B) We are justified in having beliefs about moral facts since intuition is a  
cognitive faculty similar to sense-perception in some respects, but unlike sense-perception 
insofar as the state of affairs perceived are not part of the causal order. (Miller, 35)  
He argues that both possibilities fail.  (A) fails because “’correct moral judgments access the moral 
facts because they are the upshot of exercises of the capacity to form correct moral judgments’ is 
trivial and completely unexplanatory” (Miller, 35)  (B) fails because it does not tell us the relevant 
aspects of intuition that make it similar to sense-perception, moreover, that those similarities are 
relevant for our justifying beliefs in the same way that we justify beliefs derived of sense-
perception.(Miller, 35-6.)  Note that beliefs derived of sense perception, on my account, are not 
foundational since other beliefs are necessary to justifying them. 
72 Gilbert Harman uses the example of burning a cat in Nature and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 4. 
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 describes "is not part of the part of the causal order and is not detectable by the 
senses."73  Non-moral facts, on the other hand, have a causal story about how they 
come to be represented as beliefs.  Consider my dog Annabelle.  I have a justified 
belief that she is curled up in front of the fireplace.  There is a causal story that 
coheres with the beliefs I have of Annabelle, how that belief comes to be represented 
in my mind; and, moreover, those beliefs cohere with (almost all) of the rest of my 
beliefs: e.g. that I remember getting a dog, naming her "Annabelle," raising her, etc.74   
There are, however, no theories for perceiving moral facts that cohere well with other 
beliefs about how I come to hold beliefs that are justified.  There is not a causal story 
for how intuitions are manifested as beliefs.  They just seem to 'pop' into conscious 
thought.     
BonJour points to the same problem: there is no causal relation between my 
belief that p and the object or situation to which p pertains.75  If moral facts exist, 
then, as far as a faculty of intuition is similar to a faculty of perception, we 
presumably need a causal story of how mind-independent moral facts are causally 
related to the beliefs one has of them.  BonJour, however, points out that we ought to 
not take the analogy of intuition and sense perception too seriously.  It represents, to 
an extent, the apprehension of self-evident truths.  It does not, however, 
                                                                                                                                           
If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, 
you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure 
anything out; you can see that it is wrong. 
73 Miller, 35. 
74 Cognitive science describes how I perceive, how those perceptions come to be represented in my 
mind and that I hold beliefs about them.  In general, there is a theory about light waves; how they 
interact with physical objects (like Annabelle); and how they interact with the physiology of my eyes 
(cornea, rods, cones, nerve fibers, etc.) to become representation in my mind, which I then can attribute 
beliefs to.  Note that these scientific theories about perception and belief formation are part of the 
coherent structure of justification for my belief that Annabelle is actually in front of the fireplace.   
75 BonJour, 156. 
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 straightforwardly represent the metaphysical relation of one's apprehensions and 
those things that they are apprehending.  This relationship is one that the current 
project butts up against but does not address directly.  The nature of the moral 
universe will have to be left for elsewhere.76    
The External Criterion Problem 
In In Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour articulates and attempts to defend a 
traditional rationalist theory of a priori  justification.  BonJour argues that a priori 
justification is attainable by rational insight, or what I have been calling "intuition."  
BonJour argues that establishing independent criteria to prevent biased and dogmatic 
intuition is "inherently futile" since such criteria will be empirically defined.77  The 
objection continues: 
[N]either the justification of such a criterion nor its application to a particular case could 
conceivably be a matter of direct observation, both would have to involve reasoning or non-
observational judgment and thus would have to appeal to non-discursive, a priori insights of 
precisely the sort that raise the concern about bias and dogmatism in the first place.  And, to 
appeal to that same criterion to resolve these new worries would be both circular (as regards 
its justification) and viciously regressive (as regards its application).78
I have already pointed out that there are ways of evaluating the adequacy of 
intuition, which serve as a sort of verification, by offering other routes to justifying 
                                                 
76 Walter Sinnott-Armstong criticizes Audi’s suggestion that standard sources of justification (i.e. 
perception, introspection, memory and reflection) do not need to justify their “justificatory credentials” 
(Audi, Architecture, 19).  In ”Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture of Reason,” 
Sinnott-Armstong asks Audi to provide reasons why we ought to accept the standard sources of 
justification: “Is this just a prejudice in favor of the familiar or is there some rational basis for he 
standards that Audi accepts along with the rest of us?” (187)  Like Sinnott-Armstong, I’m wary of why 
we ought to think that justification for moral beliefs can be adequately justified by perception in its 
intuitive sense.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The 
Architecture of Reason,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXVII, No. 1 (July 2003), 
181-187.  
77 BonJour, 136. 
78 Ibid. 
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 intuited knowledge - some other route via inference.  For instance, we may simply 
show that there are no reasons for thinking that the intuition is the result of dogmatic 
or biased beliefs, or some other agent may give us reasons for believing a proposition 
that they themselves arrived at intuitively, or we may internally reflect on the 
intuitively apprehended belief to see if it coheres with their other beliefs (some of 
which may also be intuitively derived).  The intuition can be confirmed to some 
degree.  These sorts of justifications do not undermine the a priori character of 
intuition.  These observations do not constitute external criteria, but a means by 
which one can (internally) correct one's intuitions.79  By re-examining the self-
evident proposition, one can continue to see it as self-evident.  Or, see that the 
propositions coheres well with other beliefs that one has. 
There is a further worry that is spurred by The External Criteria Problem.  
That is, empirical evaluation of intuitions cannot serve to justify them in a way that 
confirms that they are a priori true.  Such evidences can confirm or disconfirm, but 
such confirmation or disconfirmation will have empirical or a posteriori character.  
However, BonJour begs the question against empirical evaluations of a priori 
knowledge, i.e. intuition.  The phenomenon he calls rational insight, or intuition, has 
properties that are not knowable via one's own phenomenological evaluation of 
intuition, i.e. one's own experience of it does not grasp unconscious thinking that may 
be operative in intuition.  Empirical evidence suggests that the phenomenon that we 
experience as intuition is neither non-discursive nor non-inferential.  Thus, BonJour is 
                                                 
79 If one is pressed into admitting that they are indeed external criteria, one should hold that they are 
second-order criteria for accepting intuitive beliefs. 
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 wrong about his characterization of the intuitive faculty.  Evidence from cognitive 
science will show this. 
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 Chapter 3 
Mediocre Intuitionism 
It is important to note a range of philosophers who use intuitions in the course 
of moral decision-making, but do not make any claims to the epistemic priority of 
intuited beliefs over or above other beliefs.  I term these sorts of philosophers 
Mediocre Intuitionists.  One of the most outstanding is John Rawls.80  In both his 
early and late writings, Rawls does not take intuition to offer any sort of ‘special’ 
knowledge. 
John Rawls speaks of ‘moral insight’ in “Outline for a Decision Procedure for 
Ethics.” 81  He writes,  
[I]t is required that the judgment be intuitive with respect to ethical principles, that is, that it 
should not be determined by a conscious application of principles so far as this may be 
evidenced by introspection.  […] An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough 
inquiry into the facts of the case, and it may follow a series of reflections on the possible 
effects of different decisions, and even the application of a common sense rule […] .  What is 
required is that the judgment not be determined by a systematic and conscious use of ethical 
principles.82   
The sort of judgment Rawls articulates is, roughly, an intuitive one.  I take this 
to be the operation of a 'moral insight' by a normally intelligent persons who use 
                                                 
80 R.M. Hare, in Moral Thinking, classifies John Rawls as an “intuitionist.”  He writes,  
True, few philosophers are prepared to own to the name ‘intuitionist’; but the majority use 
arguments which would have no cogency unless intuitionist assumptions were made.  
Professor Rawls (1971) is a good example.  Having […] diverted the name ‘intuitionism’ into 
a new meaning, in which it means something like ‘pluralism’, and signifies the belief that 
there are moral principles which are logically independent of one another (a belief which 
could be held by many besides intuitionists, and which intuitionists who are monists and 
believe in a single all-sufficient moral principle could deny), Rawls then proceeds, although 
disclaiming the name, to use appeals to intuition at all the crucial points in his arguments, 
which he would not do unless he believed that this was a valid method of reasoning. R.M. 
Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods, and Point (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981), 75. 
81 John Rawls “Outline for a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” The Philosophical Review 60, no. 2 
(April 1951), 178; 177-197.   
82 Rawls, 183.  
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 common sense reasoning of the soft logics of ordinary moral discourse.  That is, they 
do not require rigorous explanation of intuitions in the process of making moral 
judgments.  Moral judges use intuitions in making moral judgments because, overall, 
they are productive in constructing a satisfactory moral theory (perhaps by the 
process of wide reflective equilibrium).83  Note: Rawls' metaphysical commitments in 
regard to intuition differ between his early and late writings.  Early Rawls is simply 
neutral in regard to the metaphysical and epistemological commitments of an intuitive 
capacity of moral agents.  Later Rawls is opposed to moral intuitionism (and moral 
facts) that would violate or preclude persons from being heteronymous.84
Principlism and casuistry, which I articulated above, seem to fit the 
description of the Mediocre Intuitionism as well.  Neither makes metaphysical claims 
to what intuitions entail, however, both theories require the use of intuition. 
I set aside Mediocre Intuitionism since the sort of knowledge arrived at is not 
intuitive knowledge: intuitions of this sort lack the epistemological underpinnings to 
                                                 
83 Alternatively, we might take Mediocre Intuitionists  to defend a proper functioning theory like that 
which Alvin Plantinga Defends:   
… a belief has warrant for me only if (1) it has been produced in me by cognitive faculty that 
are working properly (functioning as they ought to, subject to no cognitive disfunction) in a 
cognitive environment that is appropriate for my kinds of cognitive faculties, (2) the segment 
of the design plan governing the production of that belief is aimed at the production of true 
beliefs, and (3) there is a high statistical probability that a belief produced under those 
conditions will be true. From Richard Feldman, Epistemology, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2003), 100. Original in Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Functioning 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 59. 
We may even construe more broadly that Rawls’ reflective equilibrium method is an intuitive 
methodology.  Brad Hooker writes in “Intuitions and Moral Theorizing” [in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-
evaluations, Ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 161.] that the reflective 
equilibrium method can be characterized as an intuitionism.  That is, the reflective equilibrium method 
hold that “Moral Theories are better to the extent that they accord with moral claims that are attractive 
in their own right – i.e. apart from any inferential support they receive from other moral claim.” 
84 See John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 77, No. 9. (Sep. 
9, 1980), 519; 526-7. Rawls, however, does not preclude that moral fact are ingredient in construing 
the principles of justice. (519). 
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 substantiate that they are self-evident, non-inferential and immediate.  I take it that 
the Mediocre Intuitionists are just not concerned with rigorous epistemological 
justification of intuitive knowledge, yet they use 'intuition', in a rough sense, in 
making moral judgments.  One might argue of particular Mediocre Intuitionists, e.g. 
principlists, that intuitive knowledge is a necessary component in the justification of, 
at least, some of their moral judgments.  As such, a more rigorous explanation of 
intuition is required of those Mediocre Intuitionists.  Should this be the case, some of 
the objections to Classical Intuitionism might concern Mediocre Intuitionism.  Thus, 
some Mediocre Intuitionists might be aided in by the conception of intuition that 
comes out of cognitive science.85
Moderate Intuitionists: Robert Audi and Laurence BonJour 
Moderate Rationalism is an intuitionist position that emphasizes that intuitive 
knowledge is not indefeasible and that a faculty of intuition is fallible.  Laurence 
BonJour and Robert Audi are Moderate Rationalists.  Audi finds Ross's intuitionism 
reasonable albeit flawed in some respects.  Audi argues for a more plausible Rossian 
sort of intuitionism in The Good and the Right.  His purpose has two aims, "to 
respond to the theoretical concerns of philosophical critics of intuitionism and to 
develop an overall intuitionist position that represents a theoretical advance beyond 
Ross's view but is at least as useful as his in approaching moral problems of everyday 
life."86   
                                                 
85 I think the project of substantiating that a moral rigorous explanation of intuitive knowledge is 
needed from each Mediocre intuitionist would be much too large to take on in this project.  It will have 
to left for elsewhere. 
86 Robert Audi, The Good and the Right, ix-x. 
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 The core distinction of Moderate Intuitionism is that one's intuitions about 
moral propositions or mind-independent moral facts are not necessarily true or even 
maximally justified by virtue of our intuiting them.  In other words, intuiting moral 
propositions, or mind-independent moral facts, is not sufficient for establishing their 
indefeasible truth.   
I have already elucidated Moderate Rationalists' responses to important 
objections like Mackie's, which suppose that intuition is a "special faculty."  BonJour, 
for example, points out that the only faculties humans need to recognize via intuition 
(or self-evidence) are the abilities to understand and to think; likewise, Audi makes 
similar claims about maintaining the viability of an intuitive faculty.87   
Robert Audi 
Robert Audi in "Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics" 
distinguishes strong and weak versions of intuitionism.  The strong version of 
intuitionism holds that "the intuitive faculty yields indefeasible knowledge of self-
evident moral truths."88  A relatively weaker epistemological conception is, however, 
more plausible and more commonly held by those who advocate intuitionism.  This 
is, "roughly the thesis that basic moral judgments and basic moral principles are 
justified by the non-inferential deliverances of a rational, intuitive faculty, a mental 
capacity that contrasts with sense perception, clairvoyance, and other possible routes 
to justification."89   
                                                 
87 BonJour, 107-9.  Audi argues a similar thesis, but in much less concise statement in The Good in the 
Right (see pgs. 32 and 78).    
88 Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics,” 102-3.  
89 Ibid., 102. 
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 Audi's weak intuition has four primary characteristics.  (1) Intuitions are non-
inferential (directness requirement) since one's belief of an intuited proposition is not 
on the basis of premise(s).  (2) An intuition must be a moderately firm cognition 
(firmness requirement).  "A mere inclination to believe is not an intuition; an intuition 
tends to be a 'conviction' (a term Ross sometimes used for an intuition) and to be 
relinquished only through such weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly 
held theory or with another intuition."90  (3) Intuitions are formed merely on the basis 
of understanding the contents of the intuited proposition (comprehension 
requirement).  And, (4) (the pretheoretical requirement), "[Intuitions] are neither 
evidentially dependent on theories nor themselves theoretical hypotheses.”91 These 
represent the directness, firmness, comprehension and pretheoretical requirements, 
respectively; and are descriptive of the cognitive sense of intuition: a psychological 
state asserting some belief.  Audi distinguishes it from the propositional sense that 
concerns the content of propositions: by virtue of a proposition's content it is self-
evident. 
In The Good and the Right, Audi elucidates Ross's Intuitionism to make more 
apparent how it is different from other forms of intuitionism and he articulates a 
Rossian type of intuitionism that emphasizes intuition can be both self-evident and 
defeasible.  He makes the special point to remove Ross from Moore's shadow.  
Moore's epistemological project to establish that some moral beliefs can be 
indefeasible and foundational is, as I have shown, problematic.   
                                                 
90 Ibid., 110. 
91 Ibid.  The pretheoreticality requirement constitutes, as Audi points out, a negative dependence not a 
positive dependence.  Theoretical elements can act as defeaters of intuitions, but intuitions cannot be 
dependent on theories. 
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 In general, Audi takes self-evidence to entail that the truth of a proposition is 
contained 'in itself'.  That is, "a proposition is self-evident provided an adequate 
understanding of it is sufficient both for being justified in believing it and for 
knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that understanding."92  Audi distinguishes 
between first-order intuitions, understanding that a proposition is true (non-
inferentially); and second-order intuitions, understanding that a proposition is self-
evident and as such is non-inferential and is true in itself.  Thus, justifying intuitions 
can be twofold.  There is a first-order justification that is direct, immediate, and non-
inferential: apprehending qua intuition.  And, a second-order justification that is 
inferred: Audi's reply to The Meta-justification Problem.  It justifies our first-order 
intuition.  It is on this second-order that justification of the first-order is given by 
apprehending that the proposition has the properties of being direct, immediate, and 
non-inferential.  Audi argues that the first-order belief is all that is needed to save 
intuition form the sort of objections that challenge its foundationalism. 
I have already shown that Audi differentiates two sorts of self-evidence: 
immediate self-evidence vs. mediated self-evidence.  He also distinguishes, albeit 
problematically, conclusions of inference from conclusions of reflection.  Audi's 
supposition is that conclusions of reflection are based on reasoning that is "non-
linear" and "global" but does not contain premises or constitute 'inferentiality' in the 
process of arriving at the self-evident.  Bart Streumer points out in his review of The 
Good and the Right that Audi's reasoning for the distinction between inferential and 
non-inferential justification is not at all clear.  Streumer writes,  
                                                 
92 Audi, The Good and the Right, 49. 
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 He comes closest to explaining this when he distinguishes what he calls 'conclusions of 
inference' from 'conclusions of reflection'. He claims that conclusions of inference are 
"premised on propositions noted as evidence" (p. 45), and that reasoning that results in such 
conclusions is "premise-based" (p. 198). And he writes that conclusions of reflection "emerge 
from thinking about [something] as a whole, but not from one or more evidential premises," 
that drawing such a conclusion is "a kind of wrapping up of the question, akin to concluding a 
practical matter with a decision," that when one has drawn such a conclusion "one has 
obtained a view of the whole and thereby broadly characterized it" (pp. 45-6), and that 
reasoning that leads to such conclusions is "non-linear and in a certain way global" (p. 198).93  
 The upshot of Streumer's objection is that there is no clear line between what 
is a premise and what is not.  Moreover, why is it that we should not consider "the 
view of the whole" a premise by which base the self-evidence of a proposition?  If the 
line between what is a premise and what is not a premise is blurry, then so is the line 
between what is inferentially derived and what is non-inferentially derived.  We shall 
see that evidence from cognitive science will shed some light on the cognitive 
processes that occur when one reasons or reflects as a means to intuiting some 
propositions.   
Laurence BonJour 
Laurence BonJour is a Rationalist.  In In Defense of Pure Reason, he attempts 
"to arrive at an understanding of the nature, rationale, and limits of the a priori 
variety of epistemic justification."94  BonJour writes,  
I propose to count a proposition P as being justified a priori (for a particular person, at a 
particular time) if and only if that person has a reason for thinking P to be true that does not 
depend on any positive appeal to experience or other causally mediated, quasi-perceptual 
                                                 
93 Bart Streumer, review of The Good and the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value by 
Robert Audi, Notre Dame Philosophical Review (July 3,2004), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=3041 
(accessed March 22, 2007). 
94 BonJour, 15. 
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 contact with contingent features of the world, but only on pure thought or reason, even if the 
person's ability to understand P in question derives, in whole or in part from experience.95
BonJour's project closely parallels Audi's attempt to establish the viability of a 
moral intuitionism.  A priori justification amounts to something like an intuitive 
process of apprehending that a proposition is true, self-evidently.96  BonJour writes, 
given this understanding of the ingredients of the proposition, I am able to see or grasp or 
apprehend in a seemingly direct and unmediated way that the claim in question cannot fail to 
be true -  that the nature of redness and greenness are such as to preclude their being jointly 
realized.  It is this direct insight into the necessity of the claim in question that seems, at least 
prima facie, to justify my accepting it as true.97
Apparent intuition (and apparent self-evidence) thus provide the basis for a 
priori epistemic justification that is not infallible.98  It is possible that some intuitions 
are not genuine or that some intuited propositions are not understood in a way that 
reveals that they are intuitive or self-evident. 
Problematic for Audi and BonJour is the role of experience in intuitive 
knowledge and a priori justification.99  Audi and BonJour must reconcile direct, non-
inferential insight with the apparently required component of understanding 
propositions.  Both need to exclude from the intuitive apprehension of propositions 
that believing those propositions is inferentially based in knowledge from one's 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 11.  
96 “a priori justification occurs when the mind directly or intuitively sees or grasps or apprehends (or 
perhaps merely seems to itself to see or grasp or apprehend) a necessary fact about the nature or 
structure of reality” (Ibid., 15-16) 
97 Ibid., 101. 
98 Ibid., 113. 
99 BonJour make an important point concerning the distinction between a priori-a posteriori and 
necessary-contingent.  Sometimes that a proposition is known a priori is taken as meaning also that it 
in necessary.  And, conversely, that a proposition is known a posteriori is taken as meaning also that it 
is contingent.  BonJour points out that the a priori-a posteriori  is an “epistemological distinction 
having to do with the way in which a claim or assertion is epistemically justified.  The necessary-
contingent distinction is a metaphysical distinction having to do with the status of a proposition in 
relation to the ways the world might have been (having no immediate bearing on knowledge or 
justification)” (Ibid., 11). 
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 experiences.  If, in the process of intuitively apprehending some proposition, one 
infers the truth of that proposition from other beliefs or knowledge gained from 
experience, then the knowledge derived is not intuitive knowledge.  For example, we 
cannot know what the color red is without having an experience of 'red'.  Thus, for 
such self-evident propositions like 'Nothing can be both red and green all over and at 
the same time,' truth is inferred from experience since we could not have a concept of 
red a priori (if not 'truth' directly, then the meaning of the color red has to be 
inferred).100   
BonJour argues that experiences imprint themselves on the mind.  That is, we 
form beliefs of them.  Thus, they can be considered, once they have lost their 
empirical justification - i.e. our experiencing them, a priori in character  We can 
apprehend their content without the empirical ground that formerly served as their 
justification.  "Experiences" are no longer only knowable by experience qua 
experience.  Divorced of their empirical ground, they are now merely aspects of 
cognition - a priori in character.  BonJour follows in the tradition of Kant specifying, 
"a proposition will count as being justified a priori as long as no [positive] appeal to 
experience is needed for the proposition to be justified once it is understood, where it 
is allowed that experience may have been needed to achieve such an 
understanding."101
                                                 
100 BonJour is particularly plagued with excluding a posteriori knowledge from intuitive a priori 
justification.  Propositions entailing that one must have had some particular experience to understand 
what is contained within the proposition seem to lose their a priori character.  They are contingent 
upon the agent having some particular a posteriori knowledge or empirically grounded beliefs.   
101 Ibid., 10. 
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 To some extent, I think BonJour is correct.  However, much more can be said 
about 'understanding' and 'thinking' in regard to human intuitions and memory.  It is 
here that cognitive science becomes very relevant to discussions about the function 
and operation of intuition. 
Summary of the Problems for the Moderate Intuitionists 
The Moderate Intuitionists attempt to offer conceptions of intuition that are 
not susceptible to the critiques of Classic Intuitionism, especially those of Moorian 
Intuitionism.  However, Audi and BonJour have yet to offer a satisfactory account of 
what goes on when one 'understands' the self-evidence of a proposition.  Related is 
Audi's attempt to broaden to scope of 'non-inferentiality' in order to substantiate the 
plausibility of a mediated self-evidence.102  He is unclear how we ought to distinguish 
what is inferential from what is non-inferential.103    
Empirical examination of the underlying cognitive processes of an intuitive 
faculty have the potential to illuminate whether intuitions are in fact 'non-discursive' 
or if we just experience them as being so.  Relevant to the 'non-discursive' problem 
will be whether intuitive knowledge is indeed immediate and non-inferential. 
Also, I argue in the following that an empirically informed conception of 
intuition does not fail in the light of the External Criteria Problem, which argues that 
empirical justification of intuited beliefs undermines the a priori character of 
                                                 
102 Likewise, BonJour has broadened the concept of a priori knowledge. 
103 For a relatively short but interesting discussion of these problems in Audi’s work, see Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, “Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture of Reason,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXVII (1) (July 2003).  
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 intuition, since the objection presupposes the a priori character of intuitions.  
Evidence will show intuition should be alternatively conceived.104   
                                                 
104 Problematic for moral realism in general is the Causal Objection.  An account of how mind-
independent moral facts relate to one’s cognitions of them is needed to account for the relation 
between them.  But, this answer will have to be left for elsewhere. 
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 Chapter 4 
Cognitive Science's Study of Intuition 
The scientific study of human cognition can shed light on processes of the 
human mind.  The relationship between studies in cognitive science and the 
philosophical picture of intuition is neither straightforward nor obvious.  Cognitive 
science is still studying how the mind works, including drawing its conclusions about 
intuition.  This should not, however, deter us from our attempts to draw together 
philosophy and cognitive science.  We can still say something substantive.   
Philosophers do not do not use 'intuition' consistently.  Thus, it is not 
surprising to find difficultly in discerning a consistency between what philosophers 
call intuition and what cognitive scientists call 'intuition'. This is problematic not only 
because of the ambiguous use of 'intuition' in philosophy, but also because cognitive 
sciences uses 'intuition' to refer to a cognitive capacity that it has yet to define fully.  
Philosophers and cognitive scientists are both pointing at something similar; both 
ostensively define what they are attempting to discern.  The following are a few 
samples of cognitive science's characterization of 'intuition': 
[A] preliminary perception of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure) that is at first not 
consciously represented, but which nevertheless, guides thought and inquiry toward a hunch 
or hypothesis about the nature of coherence in question.105
 
[T]he phenomenology of insight-problem solution was characterized by a sudden, unforeseen 
flash of illumination.106
 
                                                 
105 K. S. Bowers, G. Regehr, C. Balthazard and K. Parker, “Intuition in the context of discovery,” 
Cognitive Psychology 22 (1990), 74; 72–110. 
106 Janet Metcalfe and David Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving,” Memory & 
Cognition 15, no. 3 (1987), 238; 238 – 246. 
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 [P]erception of possibilities, meaning and relationships by way of insight … [and] the 
unconscious.  Intuitions may come to the surface of consciousness suddenly, as a 'hunch', the 
sudden perception of a pattern in seemingly unrelated events, or as creative discovery.107
 
[I]f participants' metacognitions showed a sudden solution, then we should call those 
problems insight problems, and if they do not then we should not.108
 
These feelings are best thought of as affect-laden intuitions, as they appear suddenly and 
effortlessly in consciousness, with an affective valence (good or bad), but without any feeling 
of having gone through any steps of searching, weighing evidence or inferring a 
conclusion.109
 
A later and more focused examination of moral intuition is articulated by 
Jonathan Haidt in "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment."110  For Haidt, moral intuition is   
the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence 
(good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. 111
 It seems that cognitive science and philosophy start at the same 
phenomenological description of having intuitions: what Audi calls intuition in its 
'cognitive sense' as opposed to the 'propositional sense'.  The former pertains to 
occurrent or dispositional states of mind and the latter to the content of the 
propositions.  Even philosophers like Moore and BonJour who emphasize the 
propositional sense of intuition begin their examination by recognizing intuition via 
                                                 
107 I.B. Myers and M.H.  McCaulley, Manual: A Guide to the development and use of the MBTI. 
(Consulting Psychologists Press, 1986), 12. 
108 Janet Metcalfe, “Insight and Metacognition,” in Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology: 
Monitoring and Control Processes, ed. Mazzoni and Nelson (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 1998): 194; 181-197. 
109 Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?” in Trends in 
Cognitive Science 6 (2002), 517; 517-523.  
110 Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment,” Psychological Review, Vol. 108, No. 4 (2001), 814-34. 
111 Ibid., 818.   
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 its cognitive or phenomenological properties.  I submit that cognitive science has 
done the same. 
For cognitive science, intuition serves as one side to a dichotomy concerning 
how judgments occur: in general, it serves to denote fast, unconscious, and 
unintentional reasoning processes.  The contrasted alternative is a stepwise, conscious 
reasoning process.  Haidt contrasts direct and stepwise systems of judgment in the 
table below (Table 1).112
Haidt's overall project is to forward what he calls a Social Intuitionist Model 
of Moral Reasoning.  The social intuitionist model emphasizes that moral judgments 
are the result of affect-laden intuitions, contra models that hold moral judgments are 
largely the upshot of internal reflection and explicit, conscious reasoning.    Haidt's 
findings concern how moral judgments are made, not normative claims as to how 
moral judgments should be made.113  Haidt argues that intuitions are affected by 
social and cultural influences.  
Cognitive science, however, does not seem to acknowledge the epistemic 
components of intuitive knowledge.  We can, at least, acknowledge that cognitive 
science is empirically testing the same sort of intuitive capacities that are the concern 
of Moore, Ross, Prichard, BonJour, and Audi; even if they are not explicitly 
examining the epistemic character of intuitive knowledge.  Inferences from findings  
                                                 
112 Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate 
cultural variable virtues,” Daedalus 133 (4) (Fall 2004), 56. 
113 Haidt, with Craig Joseph, argues that “human beings come with an intuitive ethics, an innate 
preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving 
other human beings […] These intuitions under-gird the moral systems that cultures develop, including 
their understanding of virtues and character.  By recognizing that cultures build incommensurable 
moralities on top of a foundation of shared intuitions, we can develop new approaches to moral 
education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society” (Ibid.) 
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 Table 1: General Features of Intuitive and Reasoning Systems 
in cognitive science to their bearing on the characteristics of intuitive knowledge will 
be drawn here.  The strength of those inferences is debatable. 
It worth noting that Haidt's conception of intuition is closer to the 
philosophical conceptions of intuition that I have elucidated above than the other 
accounts.  That Haidt's notion of intuition is more recently articulated and should be 
taken seriously since his findings build upon previous empirical research and 
findings.   
My aim in the following section is to lay out relevant empirical studies of 
intuitive capacities and relate them to the arguments concerning intuition in 
philosophy: especially to investigate how they weigh in on objections to intuition.  
The upshot of these observations will show a parallel between the epistemological 
conception of intuition of the Moderate Intuitionists and the empirical studies of 
intuitive capacities.  However, one point of will come under heavy contention, i.e., 
whether intuition are truly non-inferential.  The empirical evidence shows that 
intuitions are the upshot of non-conscious or unconscious inferences.   
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 Experimental Evidence Concerning Intuition 
Surprisingly, epistemologically oriented philosophers have taken little note of 
the work that has been done in cognitive science.  It seems obvious that intuition is a 
normal aspect of human cognition: intuitions are a common aspect of human 
experience and most people claim that they have intuitions.   
Empirical study of cognitions illuminates how conscious and unconscious 
processes manifest themselves as an intuition.  Surprisingly, a relatively consistent 
picture of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies.  Cognitive science 
will be able to tell us something about the immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is 
indeed non-inferential, and whether intuition can apprehend the self-evidence of 
propositions.   
Cognitive science can also weigh in on the objections that Moderate 
Intuitionism attempts to deal with.  In particular, intuitions do seem fallible and 
defeasible.  A vivid picture of how intuition works could offer a solution to The 
Meta-justification Problem.  Also, if intuitions are painted as stepwise processes and 
subject to examination, then we can determine criteria that help produce reliable 
intuitions.  However, if we are to accept criteria for intuitions, then we must first 
overcome The External Criteria Problem - we must show that empirically defined 
criteria for the proper functioning of an intuitive faculty do not undermine self-
evident propositions' a priori assertability. 
Are Intuitions Defeasible and/or Fallible? 
Defeasible beliefs are those that can be overridden or undermined by reasons: 
either by reasons which force us to doubt the way by which the belief was formed or 
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 by reasons which are a 'better fit', are more consistent, or have better coherence with 
other relevant beliefs.  Fallible beliefs are a result of belief-forming processes that can 
make incorrect beliefs.114    
In "Intuition in Insight and Non-Insight Problem Solving," Janet Metcalfe and 
David Wiebe tested intuition's accuracy.115   They found that subjective feelings of 
knowing predicted performance on algebra problems (noninsight problems) but not 
on insight problems.116  In addition, they find that subjects' expectations of 
performance greatly overestimate their actual performance, exceedingly so on insight 
problems.117   
Metcalfe and Wiebe's study offers empirical evidence that intuited knowledge 
is fallible.  It supports the same sort of fallibility that Audi and BonJour argue for in 
connection with Moderate Intuitionism. 
  These findings weigh in on the 'Non-discursive' and the Dogmatic Objections.  
If intuitions are indeed the product of unconscious inferences, then they may have a 
stepwise functioning that could be evaluated for adequacy.  Emotional or dogmatic 
biases could be identified by these evaluations.   
Immediacy and Other Issues Relating to Intuitive Knowledge 
Bowers et al. disagree with Janet Metcalfe over the temporal immediacy (the 
phenomenological sense of immediacy) of intuitions.  Metcalfe argues that 
experimental data suggests intuitions are gestalt in that they occur suddenly and 
                                                 
114 I use ‘incorrect’ in an attempt to remain neutral in regard to what make a ‘true’ belief. 
115 Metcalfe and Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving,” 238 – 246. 
116 Criteria for insight problems, as Metcalfe and Wiebe note, were “note well defined” (240).  Most 
were labeled as such in previous literature. 
117 “Normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did subjects’ own 
predictions” (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 238). 
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 without steps or increment.  Kenneth S. Bowers, Glenn Regehr, and Claude 
Balthazard examine intuition in the context of discovery: intuition as informed 
judgment.  They argue that data suggest intuition is a response to unconscious 
inferences in mnemonic and semantic neural networks that only manifest consciously 
as gestalt-like belief formations.118  I elucidate Metcalfe's views and what Bowers et 
al. argue in the way of intuition.  I suggest that Bowers et al. do not characterize 
Metcalfe's position accurately and Metcalfe and Bowers et al. have similar 
conceptions of intuition. 
Janet Metcalfe 
Metcalfe has published a number of studies on intuition, or insight (as it is 
sometimes called).119  She has collected her more recent experimental data regarding 
intuition; presenting it in "Insight and Metacognition."120  There she argues, "many 
common physical and biological processes have the quality of spontaneous change - 
the construct itself is scientifically reputable, and the validity of the construct of 
spontaneous psychological processes in problem solving cannot be ruled out on a 
                                                 
118 Connectionism is a cognitive science approach to explain the functioning of the mind in term of 
neural networks.  Mnemonic and semantic neural networks are connectionist systems.  These systems 
have seven basic components:  
(1) a set of processing units (nodes), (2) a state of activation defined over the units, (3) an 
output function for each unit that maps it activation state onto an output, (4) a pattern of 
connectivity (with various “weights”) among units, (5) an activation rule for combining the 
inputs to a unit with its present state to produce a new activation level, (6) a learning rule that 
uses experience to modify the pattern of connectivity among the units, and (7) an environment 
in which the system functions. (Casebeer, 83) 
119 Janet Metcalfe and David Wiebe, “Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving” Memory & 
Cognition 15(3) (1987): 238 – 246.  Janet Metcalfe, ”Feeling of knowing and memory in problem 
solving,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 12(2) (1986): 288-
294;  ”Premonitions of Insight Predict Impending Error,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 12(4) (1986): 623-634; [And]  ”Insight and Metacognition,” in 
Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology: Monitoring and Control Processes, ed. Mazzoni and 
Nelson. (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998): 181-197. 
120 Metcalfe, ”Insight and Metacognition,” 181-197. 
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 priori grounds."121  She argues that this as an empirical question that can be 
uncovered by scientific investigations.  Metcalfe's investigations suggest that 
intuition, as a feeling of rightness or belief that one is correct, occurs as a "near-
spontaneous change in representations in insight problem solving that contrasts to the 
incremental changes that underlie routine problem solving."122  To show that insights 
are the upshot of a gestalt process, Metcalfe reviews three areas of cognitive data: 
'feeling-of-knowing' data about person's predictions on problem solving and memory 
retrieval tasks; amnesic patients with severe memory dysfunction - presumably if 
there is severe damage to areas of the brain responsible for memory, persons with 
such damage would not have normal insight capacities, but only if insight is the 
upshot of a memory retrieval process; and, Metcalfe argues that if insight is the 
product of memory retrieval only, then we have to account for "Menon's Paradox."123  
Metcalfe attempts to show that insights, or intuitions, occur in rapid phase 
changes.  She argues that in the same way that there is not a stable structure of H20 
among solid, liquid, or gas phases, there are not 'stable' steps that are inclusive of the 
intuitive process.  That is, there is a parallel between the rapid phase shifts that occur 
in other natural processes and those that manifest as intuitions.  Both seem to have 
intermediary steps that are not incremental: there are no coherent intermediary steps 
that lead to a conclusion.   
                                                 
121 Ibid., 181.  Metcalfe offers the phase changes of water molecules as evidence for things in nature 
having the capacity to undergo rapid, gestalt-like changes.   
122 Ibid., 188. 
123 Metcalfe argues that “memory-only theorists,” those that think that problem solving is 
accomplished by remembering the solution, cannot account for the regress problem – how the problem 
was solved the first time.  Such a view precludes that novel solutions can occur. However, Metcalfe 
points out that “it seems reasonable to postulate that there exists some process by which events, 
structures or solutions that are new emerge” (Ibid., 194-5).   
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 To evidence that these sorts of gestalt changes occur in cognition, we can look 
to examples like the Necker Cube or the duck-rabbit pictures.  Our understanding of 
the contents of these sorts of images changes rapidly, almost immediately when we 
understand that the lines that make up the images can represent more than one form.  
However, if one who sees the duck-rabbit has only ever seen a duck and never a 
rabbit, or vice versa, then they will not 'see' the other image.  Thus, it seems that some 
sort of memory is involved in gestalt perceptual changes, even though they lack 
intermediary forms of apprehension. 
Metcalfe cites previous data collected from her insight experiments.124  These 
experiments examined the role of memory in insight problem solving.  The data 
collected, Metcalfe argues, supports an argument that if insight involved memory 
retrieval that memory retrieval problems and insight tasks would have roughly the 
same pattern of results.   
Participants were given problems that they would not know the immediate 
answers to, insight problems; were also given algebra; and noninsight problems.  
Noninsight problems were multistep problems that had been designated in previous 
literature.125  Subjects were asked to indicate their feelings-of-warmth, or how close 
they felt they were to the actual solution to the problem, at 5 to 10-second intervals.  
Ratings were marked on a graduated scale labeled 'cold' to 'hot.'  Metcalfe assumes 
that if the participant indicated having greater feelings of warmth as they progress 
                                                 
124 Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) and Metcalfe (1986) 
125 An example non-insight problem: “Given containers of 163, 14, 25, and 11 ounces, and a source of 
unlimited water, obtain exactly 77 ounces of water” (Luchins, 1942).  An example insight problem: “A 
prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower.  He found in his cell a rope which was half long 
enough to permit him to reach the ground safely.  He divided the rope in half and tied the two parts 
together and escaped.  How could he have done this?” (Restle & Davis, 1962). 
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 towards solution, then it would show that the participant was proceeding, stepwise 
towards a solution - a noninsight solution.  Insight solutions, however, would not 
have gradated reports of warmth ratings.  In a second experiment, participants were 
asked to make predictions about their ability to answer on two sorts of problems, of 
which they would not know the answer to immediately: memory recall problems and 
solution problems.   
Metcalfe (and Wiebe) found that, 
(1) subjective feelings of knowing predicted performance on algebra problems but not on 
insight problems;  
(2) subjects' expectations of performance greatly exceeded their actual performance, 
especially on insight problems;  
(3) normative predictions provided a better estimate of individual performance than did 
subjects' own predictions, especially on the insight problems; and  
(4) the patterns-of-warmth ratings, which reflect subjects' feeling of approaching solution, 
differed for insight and noninsight problems.126
Metcalfe explains two possibilities for the evidence she collected.  There is a 
process underlying insight that (1) "may undergo a sudden shift - reflected in the 
metacognitive judgments," or (2) the process occurs in steps and is incremental, 
however, it is not consciously able to be inspected.127  The distinction among these 
processes at first seems moot in regard to whether insights, or intuitions, are 
inferential.  But, perhaps not, if we remember the  Moderate Intuitionist's attempts to 
broaden the notion of 'non-inferentiality'.  If the underlying process turns out to be 
gestalt-like change - metacognitive judgment without coherent intermediary steps - 
then the Moderate Intuitionist has more ground to support the claim that intuitions are 
                                                 
126 Metcalfe and Wiebe, 238. 
127 Metcalfe, ”Insight and Metacognition,” 191. 
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 non-inferential even on 'global consideration', e.g. Audi's soft self-evidence.  
However, if intuition turns out to be the upshot of unconscious stepwise judgment 
procedures, then a stronger argument that unconscious steps to a judgment do not 
constitute inferential belief formation is needed.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Metcalfe 
cannot tell us which is correct.  Bowers et al., however, contest Metcalfe's findings.128  
Their criticisms are, to an extent, misplaced. 
Bowers et al. argue that Metcalfe's "gestalt view implies that the experience of 
sudden insight reflects a genuine discontinuity in the underlying perceptual - 
cognitive processing of information - a more or less spontaneous restructuring of the 
problem that immediately yields a solution."129  However, neither of the reasons that 
Metcalfe offers for her findings entail "discontinuity."  Her analogy to similar gestalt 
events in nature is relevant here.  There is no discontinuity in water when it changes 
among liquid, gas, and solid states.  At all times, we can track its structural form and 
see that the same molecules arrange themselves into different structures.  Metcalfe 
even begins "Insight and Metacognition" by divorcing herself from these, as she puts 
it, "messenger of God views."130  Bowers et al., however, offer more substantive 
criticisms of Metcalfe's experimental assumptions. 
                                                 
128 We should note, however, Bowers et al. assume intuition as part of a judgment process.  “Most 
recent work concerned with intuition has emphasized the errors of intuitive judgment as informed 
judgment in the context of discovery.  The present research instead views intuition as informed 
judgment in the context of discovery.” Kenneth S. Bowers, et. al., “Intuition in the Context of 
Discovery,” Cognitive Psychology 22, 72-110 (1990), 72. 
129 Ibid., 95. 
130 Metcalfe, 1998, 182.  She cites Weisberg’s Creativity, Genius, and Other Myths:  
The messenger of God view assumes that creative products come about through leaps.  The 
creative person suddenly begins to produce something complete without knowing where it is 
coming from.  This view has com down to us least from the Greeks, who believed that the 
gods or the Muses breathed creative ideas into the artist […] .  Studies of famous scientists 
and artists often emphasize their spontaneous “aha!” aspect of creativity[…] .  If creative 
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 Bowers et al. challenge Metcalfe's assumption that if solution warmth ratings 
are gradated, then the solution procedure is stepwise.  They point out that, "it may 
well be that warmth ratings do not always reflect the underlying cognitive 
convergence toward a solution, much as memories can surface without an 
anticipatory or accompanying experience of remembering (Bowers & Hilgard, 1988; 
Ecich, 1984; Graf & Schacter, 1987; Schacter, 1987)."131  Thus, warmth ratings are 
poor for distinguishing insight from noninsight metacognitions. 
Bowers et al. 
Bowers et al. set out to answer, "How does a person proceed from the 
perception of three clue-words to the solution of a coherent triad?"132  They argue that 
the evidence they collected suggests that the apprehension of clue-words 
automatically activates other related words in the semantic and mnemonic neural 
networks.  Thus the phenomenon we experience as intuition is 'presupposed' by the 
underlining cognitive processing of neural networks.  This view offers a more 
concrete view of what Audi and BonJour merely call 'thinking' and 'understanding'.  
Semantic and mnemonic networks overlap to some degree.  The former is of 
conceptually related semantic terms; the latter is a set of information that has been 
coded in a particular way for easy recall.  One may create a mnemonic by associating 
conceptual ideas for a usual route they might take.  One might make a mnemonic 
                                                                                                                                           
achievements do indeed come about through great leaps of insight, brought about by 
extraordinary thought processes, in individuals who possess some unanalyzable quality called 
genius, then little more can be said.  Creative thinking must remain mysterious and 
unknowable. …  The creative capacity that the ancient Greeks assigned to the mythical gods 
has in our era been assigned to the unconscious and other exotic processes. (Weisberg, 1986, 
pp. 1-3) 
131 Bowers et al., 96. 
132 Ibid. 
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 using the route they take to class, associating buildings and landmarks with important 
concepts/words/ideas they need for an exam.  For example, one might relate Socrates 
to the 'Stadium', Plato to 'Parking', and Aristotle to 'Annex' to remember the historical 
order to the Greek philosophers since as one walks to class one first passes the 
Stadium, then Parking, and finally arrives at the Annex.  Alternatively, one might use 
the word 'spa' as a mnemonic device: Socrates, Plato and then Aristotle.  We have 
much less influence over the way that semantic networks are coded.  Consider the 
example diagram of semantic memory relations that Collins and Quillian offer 
(Figure 1).133   
 
 
Figure 1: Collins and Quillian Semantic Network 
                                                 
133 Figure is from A.M. Collins and M.R. Quillian, “Retrival Time from Semantic Memory,” Journal 
of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 8 (2) (1969), 240-7. 
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 When clue-words are related to the same word in the semantic network and 
that word is multiply activated by its associated clue-words, then "this common 
associate is more likely to be cognitively represented than competing associates 
which are not multiply activated (Collins & Loftus, 1975)."134  Intuitions, conceived 
thusly, are responses to patterns of coherence that are already part of the mind's 
structure.  Interestingly, mnemonic networks are not 'hard wired' into the brain.  Their 
contents are dependent upon individuals' experiences and learning.  That is, if one 
does not know what a dog is, then 'dog' will not be part of a semantic network. 
Bowers et al. found "that people could respond discriminately to coherence 
they could not identify, and […] that this tacit perception of coherence guided people 
gradually to an explicit representation of it in the form of a hunch or hypothesis."135  
Intuition occurs in two stages: the guiding stage and the integrative stage.  First, "By 
a process of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), clues that reflect (and 
ultimately reveal) coherence automatically activate relevant mnemonic networks - 
thereby producing a tacit or implicit perception of coherence.  […] the clues to 
coherence activate relevant mnemonic networks in a graded and cumulative 
fashion."136  There is a transition into the second, integrative stage that is experienced 
as a "sudden, gestalt-like perception or insight that seems virtually self-validating."137  
Once sufficient neural activation has been reached, the threshold between conscious 
and unconscious awareness is crossed and the agent integrates the formerly 
unconscious apprehensions of coherence into conscious representations.  The second 
                                                 
134 Bowers et al., 80. 
135 Ibid., 72 
136 Ibid., 74. 
137 Ibid. 
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 stage justifies the guiding stage by contextualizing the unconscious apprehension of 
coherence.        
There are related set of studies that support the findings of  Bowers et al. on 
unconscious affects on belief formation by John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand.  
In "The Unbearable Automaticity of Being," they show that the function of 
unconscious cognitive processes supplements much of our conscious experience of 
thought.138   Hence, their findings suggest that our awareness of our thoughts does not 
tell us the whole story of how our thoughts come to be.  Our conscious thoughts can 
have unconscious origins.  If unconscious processing is occurring before agents are 
consciously aware of intuitions or the phenomena of experiencing an intuitive faculty, 
then phenomenological immediacy, epistemological immediacy, and that intuitive 
knowledge is arrived at non-inferentially and still be self-evident needs to be re-
examined.  
We now have a way of formulating 'thinking' and 'understanding' in regard to 
apprehending self-evident proposition.  We have a theoretical structure that explains 
why intuitions seem to occur immediately and have the feeling of being direct though 
they are the upshot of stored 'memory' in neural networks.  However, it is 
questionable whether we should consider the operation of semantic and mnemonic 
neural networks to undermine the non-inferential character of intuited knowledge.  
The question still spins on what counts as a premise.  I'll leave this question for 
elsewhere. 
                                                 
138 John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,” American 
Psychologist 54, no. 7 (July 1999), 462 – 479. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Unification of the Moderate Intuitionist Position and Cognitive Science 
 
Cognitive science presents philosophers with a more complete account of 
'understanding' in relation to the faculty of intuition.  This Connectionist conception 
of 'understanding' holds that entailed in the intuitive process is the operation of 
mnemonic and semantic neural networks, whose operation is almost entirely 
unavailable to conscious introspection.  Bowers et al. offer a Connectionist 
explanation of the processes that grasp a proposition's meaning, pointing out that 
apprehensions, conscious and unconscious, correlate with activation energies of 
mnemonic and semantic neural networks.  Data from cognitive science suggest that 
this process is largely unconscious.  Intuitions are manifestations of memories/beliefs 
stored and sorted in mnemonic and semantic neural networks.139  If 'understanding' 
propositions is the upshot of the operation of these neural networks, then the intuitive 
knowledge that is the result of an intuitive faculty needs to be re-examined.  
'Understanding' takes plays a different justificatory role when it is the upshot of 
discernable cognitive processing.  In the following, I point out the implications the 
results from cognitive science have for the characteristics of intuitive knowledge.   
Self-evidence 
Given that mnemonic and semantic neural networks seem to be component in 
understanding self-evident propositions, what should we make of Audi's conception 
of self-evidence?  Audi, construes "the basic kind of self-evident proposition as 
                                                 
139 Admittedly, it is unclear to me as to how we ought to define the ‘data’ that are contained in neural 
networks. 
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 (roughly) a truth such that any adequate understanding of it meets two conditions: (1) 
in virtue of having that understanding, one is justified in believing the proposition 
(i.e., has justification for believing it, whether one in fact believes it or not); and (2) if 
one believes the proposition on the basis of that understanding of it, then one knows 
it."140  Ingredient in the conditions of self-evidence is "understanding."141  The 
grounds for 'understanding', however, are, on the Connectionist model, much more 
complex than Audi would have them be.  'Understanding', thusly conceived, is a 
distinguishable cognitive process, the contents and operation of which can be 
mapped.  The Connectionist model of semantic and mnemonic neural networks, 
which serves as this map, leads us to question whether the 'understanding' that is 
entailed by self-evidence does not preclude 'non-inferentiality' or immediacy.  
'Non-inferentiality' 
Connectionism seems obviously to report that there are inferences, as 
connections between nodes, made when one's intuitive faculty is operating.  
However, that Connectionist systems, semantic and mnemonic neural networks, are 
part of the process of intuition, does not entail that Connectionism requires inferences 
- 'connections' in neural networks may not be inferences.  Related is Audi's attempt to 
broaden the scope of 'non-inferentiality' in order to substantiate the plausibility of a 
mediated self-evidence.142  To my mind, the issue of whether mnemonic and 
                                                 
140 Audi, “Self-evidence,” 206. 
141 Note that ‘understanding’ is also entailed by the comprehension requirement for Audi’s weak 
intuitionism. 
142 Likewise, BonJour has broadened the concept of a priori knowledge.  Audi is unclear how we 
ought to distinguish what is inferential from what is non-inferential.  
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 semantic neural processing makes intuited beliefs the product of inference turns on 
what we might consider a premise and what we might consider an inference. 
Premises are, generally, those things that serve as a basis for a conclusion.  
We might say that premises 'lead us to the conclusion'.  However, we can usually be 
forthcoming with the premises we use for a particular conclusion.  A rather parochial 
example might be 'torture inflicts pain on people' and 'inflicting pain on people is 
wrong' are premises for the conclusion that 'It is wrong to torture people'.  We, 
however, cannot be forthcoming with the unconscious operations of neural networks, 
yet they still in some sense lead us to a conclusion.  But, as Audi argues in The 
Structure of Justification, beliefs may be "episodically inferential."143  For example, 
"An inferential belief [not equivalent to a belief based on inference] may be based on 
another belief with such argumental mediation; on the basis of believing that the trees 
are swaying, I may believe that the wind is blowing, without mentally passing from 
the former as premise to the latter as conclusion."144  However, I think we might 
burden Audi with having to say 'without consciously passing from the former as a 
premise to the latter as a conclusion'.  Thus, an unconscious premise may be 
inferentially involved in intuitive apprehension.   
An uncontroversial concept of a premise includes the condition that it is a 
'proposition' - i.e. something that we can attribute truth-value to.  Thusly, the 
proposition that we experience as the upshot of intuition is the product of inference 
only if it comes to be represented in consciousness on the grounds of some other 
                                                 
143 Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20. 
144 Ibid. 
70 
 proposition entailed in the unconscious processing of mnemonic and semantic neural 
networks.  To use the example above, we might experience the apprehension of 'It is 
wrong to torture people.' as self-evident and the upshot of an intuitive faculty.  
However, unconscious processing may entail the propositions 'torture inflicts pain on 
people' and 'inflicting pain on people is wrong', without which we would not 
apprehend the truth of 'It is wrong to torture people.'  That propositions are contained 
in the mnemonic and semantic neural networks does not mean that they are 
inferentially connected in a relevant way to the intuitively formed belief.  A more 
detailed account of the contents and relations of contents of neural processing needs 
to be made in regard to unconscious belief forming processes.  There are, however, 
new grounds to base questions about the non-inferential characteristic of intuitive 
knowledge.   
Immediacy 
Intuitions are phenomenologically immediate, but not epistemologically direct 
- at least, not in the sense that they directly apprehend mind-independent moral facts.  
Immediacy in the phenomenological sense is related to the issues concerning 
mediately self-evident propositions.  Bowers et al. do not seem to rule out that the 
upshot of intuitive processing is immediate.  Once neural networks reach sufficient 
activation energies, they 'pop' into consciousness, in an immediate sort of way.  
Immediacy in the epistemological sense that mind-independent moral facts are 
directly grasped by the intuitive faculty seems to be out of the picture for intuitive 
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 processing since this has more to do with what moral facts are than how we think 
about them.  I defer this issue for other discussions.145
Conclusion 
I did not accomplish what I set out to do when I began this working on this 
project: I did not come up with a coherent conception of intuition that would be 
philosophically rigorous and consistent with what we know of intuition via cognitive 
science.  That end turned out to need a much larger project - one that seems to include 
a concept or account of moral facts.  I do, however, point to the direction in which 
inquiry to substantiate a naturalized conception of an intuitive faculty should go, by 
arguing for a Connectionist approach to explaining how it is that we cogitate about 
moral matters.  The Connectionist approach, arguably, can shed light on the way we 
make moral judgments and it deserves further analysis and study.  
Some questions yet remain: (1) Are premises entailed by the functioning of 
mnemonic and semantic networks when their upshot is belief formation? That is, 
should we count 'global considerations' as premises? (2) By what means might we 
evaluate the discursive character of mnemonic and semantic networks? (3) Can we 
correlate certain sets of experience with particular self-evidences?  That is, do certain 
                                                 
145 Note: Moderate Intuitionists attempt to circumvent the problems of foundationism for intuitionism.  
A problem for the Classic Intuitionists (moral realists) is how to maintain foundational justification in 
the light of the fact that intuitive knowledge is sometimes overridden or that one might merely change 
their mind about the self-evidence of a proposition.  One can argue that intuitionists cannot invoke the 
sort justification that makes moral facts, or beliefs of moral facts, foundational in a structure of 
justification if they are inferred from other beliefs. 
Foundational justification for intuition seems undermined when intuitions are the upshot of the 
unconscious processing of the human mind.  If intuition is to give foundational moral knowledge, 
moral beliefs of the sort that we can found other moral beliefs on, then it needs to be shown how self-
evident moral propositions are epistemologically direct.  To my mind, the answer to this question 
requires a conception of mind-independent moral facts.  
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 experiences predispose agents to apprehending a set of self-evident propositions, 
while another set of experience will predispose agents to apprehending different set of 
self-evident propositions?   
Admittedly, more work needs to be done in this area.  However, studies in 
cognitive science illuminate some aspects of intuition that have been previously 
unavailable to philosophers.   
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